Initial Endowment and Redistribution: Growth and Inequality in Dynamic Public Good Game

How to cite

XUE, Lian; Cartwright, Edward; Horváth, Gergely; Mengel, Friederike. 2023. "Initial Endowment and Redistribution: Growth and Inequality in Dynamic Public Good Game." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011143. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11143-1.0

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Lian XUE* , Edward Cartwright , Gergely Horváth , Friederike Mengel

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011143
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11143-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-03-01 – 2024-06-30
Countries
China (Wuhan)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11143

Abstract

Why do some economic systems thrive while others fail? We explore the question in an experimental framework with the dynamic public good game (Gachter et al., 2017), where each agent's wealth at the end of period t serves as her endowment in t+1. We exogenously vary the initial endowment equality and the existence of market institutions for redistribution across treatments to examine factors that affect growth and inequality within and across experimental groups. In a 2 by 3 between-subject design, we vary two key factors: (1) whether participants' initial endowment is equal or unequal (with half of the participants receiving twice the endowment). (2) whether participants have the opportunity to redistribute, through uniform taxation, at the end of a period. Additionally, we compare whether the redistribution policy is endogenously voted among group members or exogenous given by the experimenter.
At the end of the experiment, we also elicit for individuals' individual characteristics and risk-, social- and redistributive preferences.
We aim to identify the causal impact of initial equality and redistribution policies on growth and inequality, the correlation between individual preferences and cooperative behaviour (i.e., contribution and voting) and heterogeneous effects across individuals.

Reference
Gächter, Simon, Friederike Mengel, Elias Tsakas, and Alexander Vostroknutov. "Growth and inequality in public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 150 (2017): 1-13.

Intervention

Our experiment has a 2-by-3 experimental design, varying initial endowments and market institutions. Specifically, we manipulate two treatment arms:
(1) Inequal initial endowment and Equal initial endowment (between-subject): We first vary whether four players in a group receive the same initial endowment or the rich halves receive twice as much endowment as the poor halves.
(2) Market institutions: We next vary the existence and structure of the institutions regarding redistribution. NoTax treatments serve as a baseline where there is no market(between-subject). In EndogeneousTax treatments, participants can vote for their preferred tax rate, ranging from 0%, 10%, 25% and 50%, every 3 rounds for 5 times across the 15 rounds, with the dictator rule where a randomly selected dictator's choice is implemented. In ExogenousTax treatments, participants face an exogenous tax rate every 3 rounds predetermined by the experimenter.

Experimental design

We adapted the dynamic public good game framework following Gachter et al. (2017). Participants in groups of four play the public good game in a repeated interaction of 15 periods. Unlike standard public good games, there are dynamic interdependencies across periods in our game, i.e., each participant's payoff (wealth after tax) at the end of period t serves as her endowment in t+1 period.
We vary initial endowments and institutions across treatments. For equal endowment treatments, the initial endowment is 30 tokens for each participant. For unequal endowment treatments, the initial endowments are 20 and 40 for each half of the participants in a group. The MPCR is set at 1.5.
At the end of the experiment, participants complete a questionnaire about their individual characteristics and economic preferences, including risk, prosocial and redistributive preferences.
Participants will be paid based on their final earnings at the end of the 15th round, with 1 token converted to 0.05 yuan, in addition to a 20 yuan participation payment.

Reference
Gächter, Simon, Friederike Mengel, Elias Tsakas, and Alexander Vostroknutov. "Growth and inequality in public good provision." Journal of Public Economics 150 (2017): 1-13.

Design details

Randomization method
Standard laboratory randomization in recruitment using the Weikeyan System.
Randomization unit
The unit of observation can be at the individual-period level; group-period level; or group level; depending on the designated hypotheses testing.
Clusters
We have conducted power analysis after collecting data from 6 groups for each treatment. We use two-sample Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests to compare the treatments. The outcomes are the final wealth level and the final Gini-coefficient in the group measured in period 15. One group thus yields one observation of the outcome variables. We compute the standard deviation of outcomes across groups using this sample of 6 groups. We intend to collect at least 20 groups of data. We computed the estimated effect size we will be able to detect with 20 groups at conventional power level of 80% and significance level of 0.05.
Observations
480 participants.
Arms
80 participants in each treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Within-group wealth and inequality, measured by the mean and standard deviation or the Gini coefficient at the end of the 15th round, within groups among four group members. Across-group wealth and inequality, measured by the mean and standard deviation or the gini coefficient, across groups in each treatment.
Secondary outcomes
Redistributive preferences

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Keywords