History-dependent monetary policy rules in the lab
How to cite
Isabelle, Salle; Truong, Hung. 2023. "History-dependent monetary policy rules in the lab." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011128. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11128-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Price-level targeting (PLT) is optimal under the theory of rational expectations (RE), i.e. when expectations are in line with the monetary policy rule, but lacks empirical support. Given the hurdles to the implementation of macroeconomic field experiments, we utilize a laboratory forecasting group experiment -- where expectations come from human subjects -- to collect data on expectations, inflation and output dynamics under the traditional inflation targeting (IT) framework and PLT confronted with both deflationary and cost-push shocks. This sequence of shocks is designed to approximate the recent course of events. We add a third treatment where PLT is augmented with central bank communication about the time-dependent inflation rate that would be consistent with closing the price gap in each period. Under RE, this additional piece of information is redundant because agents are supposed to form model-consistent expectations.
Intervention
We have three treatments: one inflation-targeting monetary policy rule, one price-level targeting monetary policy rule and one price-level targeting monetary policy rule augmented with communication about the time-varying inflation target that is consistent with closing the price gap. We have six groups of six subjects each.
Experimental design
The experiment belongs to the class of learning-to-forecast experiments: a standard three-equation New Keynesian model serves as the underlying data generating process. Its expectational variables are taken directly from the subjects (aggregated using the arithmetic mean) in each period and fed into the model which returns the actual values of these variables. This process is repeated for 75 periods.
The first 40 periods simulate a deflationary environment: after some small white noise shocks, a large deflationary shock is implemented in period 10 and lasts for three periods. The second submission of 35 periods features an inflationary environment with a similar cost-push shock.
The only difference between the three treatments is the monetary policy rule and the information set of the subjects. In all treatments, the subjects know the inflation target of the central bank. In the control treatment, the central bank implements a standard inflation targeting rule. We then have two treatments related to the alternative of price-level targeting: the first one only implements the monetary rule, without any further information; in the second one, we communicate to the subjects in each period the inflation rate that would be consistent with closing the price gap.
Design details
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