Whistleblowing and Competition
How to cite
Ioannidis, Konstantinos. 2023. "Whistleblowing and Competition." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011051. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11051-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Whistleblowing, i.e. the act of reporting illegal actions of a manager by an employee, is an important tool to uncover corporate fraud. Previous experimental literature has studied firms independently of each other. However, competition between firms can be an important driver of corrupt behaviour. In an experiment, we use treatments with and without firm competition and conjecture that whistleblowing is less likely under competition. We additionally explore whether managers and employees form self-serving beliefs about the prevalence and acceptability of cheating and non-whistleblowing.
Experimental design
General structure of the experiment
Each session will have 15 subjects. Three will randomly assigned to be managers of the three firms and keep their role throughout the session. The remaining subjects are randomly assigned in each round into six employees (two per firm) and six members of the public. They will play the whistleblowing game of Butler et al, 2020 repeatedly for 12 rounds. At the end of the experiment I elicit demographics (gender, age, field of study), incentivized beliefs and morality judgements described in the secondary outcomes above, risk preferences (Eckel & Grossman, 2002), and social value orientation (Murphy et al. 2011)
Treatments
(i) baseline: payoffs of all firms are independent (same as Butler et al, 2020)
(ii) competition: the surpluses of firms are compared and the winner gets an additional bonus (multiplied by 1.5) while the other two firms get a reduction (multiplied by 0.75).
Alternative hypotheses for main treatment effect
H1: The frequency of whistleblowing is lower in competition.
H2: The frequency of breaking the law is higher in competition.
Analysis of main effects
As the key specification, I use regressions of the dependent variables (either whistleblowing or breaking the law) on treatment dummies, using each choice as an observation. I cluster standard errors on the matching group level. I will also estimate these models with subject controls (risk preferences, social preferences, gender, age). Robustness of main results will be checked using non-parametric tests (ranksum tests) with data averaged on the matching group level.
Analysis for exploratory effects of beliefs and morality judgements
We expect to see lower beliefs about the frequency of whistleblowing and higher about lawbreaking under competition as well as less harsh judgements for employees and managers who stay silent and break the law respectively. We also expect to observe higher loyalty to the firm under competition. All those exploratory hypotheses will be tested non-parametrically with ranksum tests.
Design details
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