Whistleblowing and Competition

How to cite

Ioannidis, Konstantinos. 2023. "Whistleblowing and Competition." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011051. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11051-2.1

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Konstantinos Ioannidis*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0011051
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11051-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-03-20 – 2023-06-01
Countries
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/11051

Abstract

Whistleblowing, i.e. the act of reporting illegal actions of a manager by an employee, is an important tool to uncover corporate fraud. Previous experimental literature has studied firms independently of each other. However, competition between firms can be an important driver of corrupt behaviour. In an experiment, we use treatments with and without firm competition and conjecture that whistleblowing is less likely under competition. We additionally explore whether managers and employees form self-serving beliefs about the prevalence and acceptability of cheating and non-whistleblowing.

Experimental design

General structure of the experiment

Each session will have 15 subjects. Three will randomly assigned to be managers of the three firms and keep their role throughout the session. The remaining subjects are randomly assigned in each round into six employees (two per firm) and six members of the public. They will play the whistleblowing game of Butler et al, 2020 repeatedly for 12 rounds. At the end of the experiment I elicit demographics (gender, age, field of study), incentivized beliefs and morality judgements described in the secondary outcomes above, risk preferences (Eckel & Grossman, 2002), and social value orientation (Murphy et al. 2011)

Treatments

(i) baseline: payoffs of all firms are independent (same as Butler et al, 2020)
(ii) competition: the surpluses of firms are compared and the winner gets an additional bonus (multiplied by 1.5) while the other two firms get a reduction (multiplied by 0.75).

Alternative hypotheses for main treatment effect

H1: The frequency of whistleblowing is lower in competition.
H2: The frequency of breaking the law is higher in competition.

Analysis of main effects

As the key specification, I use regressions of the dependent variables (either whistleblowing or breaking the law) on treatment dummies, using each choice as an observation. I cluster standard errors on the matching group level. I will also estimate these models with subject controls (risk preferences, social preferences, gender, age). Robustness of main results will be checked using non-parametric tests (ranksum tests) with data averaged on the matching group level.

Analysis for exploratory effects of beliefs and morality judgements
We expect to see lower beliefs about the frequency of whistleblowing and higher about lawbreaking under competition as well as less harsh judgements for employees and managers who stay silent and break the law respectively. We also expect to observe higher loyalty to the firm under competition. All those exploratory hypotheses will be tested non-parametrically with ranksum tests.

Design details

Randomization method
Computerized randomization
Randomization unit
Session level
Clusters
16 sessions of 15 participants
Observations
240 participants
Arms
8 sessions per treatment (60 participants)
Primary outcomes
(i) Share of employees choosing to "blow the whistle" (ii) Share of managers choosing "break the law"
Secondary outcomes
(i) Belief about the frequency of whistleblowing (integer between 0 and 72) (ii) Belief about the frequency of breaking the law (integer between 0 and 36) (iii) Morality judgement of employee not blowing the whistle (Likert scale from very immoral to very moral) (iv) Morality judgement of manager breaking the law (Likert scale from very immoral to very moral) (v) Morality judgement of public losing money due to managers breaking the law (Likert scale from very immoral to very moral) (vi) Employee loyalty to the firm (Likert scale from not loyal at all to very loyal)

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords