Peers and Motivation at Work

How to cite

Kerwin, Jason; Chyn, Eric; Brune, Lasse. 2016. "Peers and Motivation at Work." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001105. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1105-3.0

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Jason Kerwin* , Eric Chyn , Lasse Brune

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001105
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1105-3.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-02-02 – 2016-03-31
Countries
Malawi ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1105

Abstract

This study comprises two experiments. The first experiment randomly assigns tea-harvesting workers to locations on fields to estimate peer effects in output. The second is an incentivized choice experiment that measures workers' willingness to pay for higher-ability peers.

Experimental design

Our peer effects estimation experiment consists of two steps:
1. Random assignment of workers to peers.
2. Using randomly-assigned peers and daily output data to estimate a linear-in-means model of peer effects.

Our incentivized choice experiment consists of three steps:
1. Random assignment of workers to peers. This was implemented starting in late February.
2. A survey containing the incentivized choice experiment to elicit WTP. This begins on March 7, 2016.
3. Workers’s positions are changed to implement the choices for the 10% of people who chose faster peers. This happens immediately after the survey ends, and is done to make the elicited choices incentive-compatible.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer (for random peer assignment). Randomization done in the field on tablets (for implementation of the incentivized choices with p=0.1)
Randomization unit
For the first experiment, randomization is within-individual at a level of cycle day. For the second experiment, randomization is at the individual level.
Clusters
999 workers
Observations
999 workers
Arms
Not applicable – no treatment arms. Each worker is randomly assigned to peers.
Primary outcomes
Our outcome for the peer effects estimation experiment is the daily log output of tea. Our key outcome for the incentivized choice experiment is the willingness to pay for higher-ability peers. See the pre-analysis plan for details.

Materials

Papers from this trial

  1. Brune, L., Chyn, E., & Kerwin, J. (2022). Peers and Motivation at Work Evidence from a Firm Experiment in Malawi*. Journal of Human Resources, 0919-10416R2. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.4.0919-10416R2 https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.4.0919-10416R2

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords