Zambia VAT incentive experiments: version 2
How to cite
Dillon, Brian; Siwale, Twivwe; Mulenga, John; Jang, Jihye. 2023. "Zambia VAT incentive experiments: version 2." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0011009. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.11009-2.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project is on the topic of tax leakage and policy interventions to increase VAT compliance in Zambia. We will test the impact of a probabilistic incentive (similar to a lottery ticket) on the extent to which small retailers in Lusaka request VAT invoices when making purchases from their suppliers. We will examine heterogeneous impacts by some key firm characteristics measured at baseline.
In a second experiment launched concurrently with the end of the first, we will test whether a tax morale message has an impact on the value of VAT invoices retained by firms after the removal of financial incentives. This is a study of habit formation and the possibility of transitioning from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation to assist with tax compliance.
Intervention
All study firms are asked to request and retain receipts and invoices when making purchases from their suppliers. At each follow-up visit, treated firms are provided with the opportunity to play a lottery-style game to win a cash prize. The probability of winning cash is increasing in the total value of VAT invoices retained.
We launched a second intervention in July-August 2023, as the lottery experiment wrapped up. We asked all firms to continue retaining receipts and invoices for the coming months, but removed all financial incentives. We now randomized firms into two new groups, treatment and control, for a new experiment we call the messaging experiment. The treatment group received a message intended to prime tax morale and intrinsic motivation to support tax compliance, the control group received a placebo message.
Experimental design
We randomize 1083 small retail firms in Lusaka, which we enrolled in a baseline survey, into three treatment arms:
Control (407 firms)
Low treatment (338 firms)
High treatment (338 firms)
Treated firms receive either a low or a high financial incentive to request and retain VAT invoices from their suppliers. Treatment assignment is at the individual firm level, stratified on key characteristics that we identified at baseline.
Updatee July 2023:
At the conclusion of the above experiment, we launched a second RCT involving a tax morale message. 816 firms were still participating as of July 2023. We randomly assigned 50% to messaging treatment and 50% to messaging control (408 each), at the firm level.
Design details
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