Strategic Communication and the Underuse of Incentive-Based Credibility: Experimental Evidence
How to cite
Ressi, Anna; Feess, Eberhard; Jost, Peter-J.. 2023. "Strategic Communication and the Underuse of Incentive-Based Credibility: Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010984. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10984-4.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
In many economically important environments, people receive information from sources whose interests are transparent. Such communication naturally invites skepticism because receivers understand that senders have incentives to influence their beliefs. However, skepticism should not be indiscriminate. When a sender communicates a message that contradicts the direction in which the sender benefits from influencing the receiver, the message becomes particularly credible because it is difficult to reconcile with purely opportunistic behavior.
In this paper, we ask whether receivers exploit this credibility of such incentive-incongruent messages or whether they continue to rely primarily on their own judgment, even when sender incentives imply that a message is unusually likely to be true?
Participants in our experiment act as receivers. They first answer factual questions comparing outcomes under the Obama and Trump administrations. They then observe a message from a sender in a previous study. Senders knew the correct answer, could send either possible message, and had a monetary incentive to induce either an "Obama" or a "Trump" answer. Receivers know the sender's incentive and earn a bonus for choosing the correct answer. This setup allows us to examine how receivers respond to messages, depending on the senders’ incentives and their own prior beliefs.
In additional treatments, we either elicit participants’ estimates of how frequently senders lie or provide them with explicit information on this frequency. This allows us to examine how underreaction to credible messages can be explained and mitigated.
Experimental design
Participants in the role of receivers know that there are two main stages of which only one will be randomly chosen for determining their bonus.
In stage 1 of the experiment, we randomly select two out of four questions. For half of the questions, the correct answer is “Obama” and for the other half, the correct answer is “Trump”. Specifically, participants are asked for their belief on whether the unemployment rate in a particular US state, and the crime rate in another US state, was lower during the Obama or the Trump administration. The two questions are presented in a random order. Participants know that, given that stage 1 is paid out, exactly one of the two questions will be randomly chosen to determine their payoff and that they will receive a bonus if and only if their answer to this question is correct. For each question, we also ask them how certain they are that their belief is correct.
In stage 2, receivers can revise their previous answers based on a message of a sender in a previous study. For those messages, we use data from a previous study. Hence, all participants in our new experiment are receivers. In this previous study, we informed senders about the correct answer. For each question, they could then send one out of two possible messages, suggesting that the correct answer is “Obama” or “Trump”. Each of the two messages was sent to a receiver of the previous study. Senders in treatment TRUMP (OBAMA) knew that they would receive a bonus if and only if the receiver’s answered “Trump” (“Obama”).
Receivers are informed that senders knew the correct answers but did not need to report truthfully. We also inform them about the senders’ incentives. After they receive the senders’ messages, we again ask them whether they believe that “Obama” or “Trump” is the correct answer. Receivers know that, given that stage 2 is paid out, they will get a bonus if and only if their answer is correct.
To elicit the receivers’ responses to the senders’ messages, we use the strategy-method: For each of the two questions, receivers have to choose between “Obama” and “Trump” for each of the two possible messages of the sender. Payoffs are calculated based on the message the sender actually sent.
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we elicit basic demographic information and personal attitudes, such as their political affiliation.
Overall, our first treatment manipulation varies the senders’ incentives:
o In treatment OBAMA, receivers know that the senders got a bonus if and only if the receiver they were matched with announces that “Obama” is the correct answer.
o In treatment TRUMP, receivers know that the senders got a bonus if and only if the receiver they were matched with announces that “Trump” is the correct answer.
We also have the following additional treatment variations:
o Treatment A1 & A2: We ask receivers the following incentivized questions before (treatment A1) or after (treatment A2) they provide their final answers:
• If (TRUMP / OBAMA) is the correct answer, how many out of 100 senders sent the true message (TRUMP / OBAMA).
• If (OBAMA / TRUMP) is the correct answer, how many out of 100 senders sent the false message (TRUMP / OBAMA).
For each of the two questions, they will get an additional bonus of £0.10 if their guess is less than 5 percentage points away from the true share.
o Treatment B: We give receivers the following information before they provide their final answers
• If (TRUMP / OBAMA) is the correct answer, (95 / 96) out of 100 senders sent the true message (TRUMP / OBAMA).
• If (OBAMA / TRUMP) is the correct answer, (52 / 63) out of 100 senders sent the false message (TRUMP / OBAMA).
o Treatment C: We give receivers the following information before they provide their final answers:
• Out of 100 messages (TRUMP / OBAMA), (66 / 62) were true.
• Out of 100 messages (OBAMA / TRUMP), (89 / 90) were true.
o Treatment D: Before receivers provide their final answers, we ask them to imagine that they are in the role of the sender and ask them the following two questions:
• Suppose (TRUMP / OBAMA) is correct. Which message would you send?
• Suppose (OBAMA / TRUMP) is correct. Which message would you send?
As in treatment A2, we also elicit their estimated lying frequencies after they provide their final answer.
We use a between-subject design: Each subject participates in only one treatment. The experiment will be conducted online using the survey software Qualtrics and participants will be recruited using Prolific. We will require participants to reside in the US and show an approval rate of at least 95%. Participants who answered the majority of our comprehension questions incorrectly will not be allowed to continue and will hence not be included our sample. Moreover, in the post-experimental questionnaire, participants are asked whether they looked up the answers to the estimation questions on the internet. Those who respond “Yes” will be excluded from the statistical analysis.
Design details
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