Decomposing indirect reciprocity

How to cite

Drucker, L. Flóra; Khayouti, Sara; Horn, Daniel; Kiss, Hubert Janos. 2023. "Decomposing indirect reciprocity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010972. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10972-1.0

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L. Flóra Drucker* , Sara Khayouti , Daniel Horn , Hubert Janos Kiss

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010972
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10972-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-03-27 – 2023-06-30
Countries
Hungary (), United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10972

Abstract

We use the three-games design of Cox (2004) to identify the mechanisms behind first- and second-mover behavior in indirect reciprocity. We first look at upstream reciprocity, where Player X helps Player Y, and therefore Player Y helps Player Z. We aim to disentangle pure other-regarding preferences from strategic considerations in Player X's behavior, and other-regarding preferences from wanting to reciprocate a kind action in Player Y's behavior.

Experimental design

In the baseline three-games design of Cox (2004), Treatment A plays the classical trust game where Players X and Y start with the same endowment. Player X sends an amount of money to Player Y from her endowment, the amount gets tripled, and Player Y decides how much to send back to Player X from the tripled amount. In Treatment B, only Player X has a choice: she sends an amount to Player Y from her endowment, which gets tripled, and Player Y keeps this amount. In Treatment C, Player X has no choice: an amount is taken from their endowment and sent to Player Y. The amount then gets tripled, and Player Y decides how much to send back to Player X from the tripled amount.

We extend this design first to upstream reciprocity. In baseline Treatment A, three players start with the same endowment. Player X decides how much to send from her endowment to Player Y, where the sent amount gets tripled. Player Y then decides how much to send to Player Z from her total endowment, where the sent amount gets tripled again. In Treatment B, only Player A has a choice: she sends an amount to Player Y from her endowment, which gets tripled, and Player Y keeps this amount. Player Z also keeps her initial endowment. In Treatment C, only Player Y has a choice. First, an amount of money is taken from Player X's endowment and sent to Player Y. The amount then gets tripled, and Player Y decides how much to send to Player Z, where the sent amount gets tripled again.

The comparison of Treatments A and B shows whether, in the baseline treatment, the choices of Players X have a strategic component, i.e., whether they expect Players Y to send some of their endowment to Players Z. The comparison of Treatments A and C shows whether Players Y behave differently when their total endowment was a result of a kind action from Players X from when Players X did not have a choice.

Design details

Randomization method
by a computer
Randomization unit
individual
Clusters
0
Observations
450 individuals
Arms
50 groups of three per treatment
Primary outcomes
average amount sent and sent back by participants

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords