Decomposing indirect reciprocity
How to cite
Drucker, L. Flóra; Khayouti, Sara; Horn, Daniel; Kiss, Hubert Janos. 2023. "Decomposing indirect reciprocity." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010972. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10972-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We use the three-games design of Cox (2004) to identify the mechanisms behind first- and second-mover behavior in indirect reciprocity. We first look at upstream reciprocity, where Player X helps Player Y, and therefore Player Y helps Player Z. We aim to disentangle pure other-regarding preferences from strategic considerations in Player X's behavior, and other-regarding preferences from wanting to reciprocate a kind action in Player Y's behavior.
Experimental design
In the baseline three-games design of Cox (2004), Treatment A plays the classical trust game where Players X and Y start with the same endowment. Player X sends an amount of money to Player Y from her endowment, the amount gets tripled, and Player Y decides how much to send back to Player X from the tripled amount. In Treatment B, only Player X has a choice: she sends an amount to Player Y from her endowment, which gets tripled, and Player Y keeps this amount. In Treatment C, Player X has no choice: an amount is taken from their endowment and sent to Player Y. The amount then gets tripled, and Player Y decides how much to send back to Player X from the tripled amount.
We extend this design first to upstream reciprocity. In baseline Treatment A, three players start with the same endowment. Player X decides how much to send from her endowment to Player Y, where the sent amount gets tripled. Player Y then decides how much to send to Player Z from her total endowment, where the sent amount gets tripled again. In Treatment B, only Player A has a choice: she sends an amount to Player Y from her endowment, which gets tripled, and Player Y keeps this amount. Player Z also keeps her initial endowment. In Treatment C, only Player Y has a choice. First, an amount of money is taken from Player X's endowment and sent to Player Y. The amount then gets tripled, and Player Y decides how much to send to Player Z, where the sent amount gets tripled again.
The comparison of Treatments A and B shows whether, in the baseline treatment, the choices of Players X have a strategic component, i.e., whether they expect Players Y to send some of their endowment to Players Z. The comparison of Treatments A and C shows whether Players Y behave differently when their total endowment was a result of a kind action from Players X from when Players X did not have a choice.
Design details
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