Paternalistic Discrimination

How to cite

Buchmann, Nina; Sullivan, Colin; Meyer, Carl. 2023. "Paternalistic Discrimination." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010971. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10971-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Nina Buchmann* , Colin Sullivan , Carl Meyer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010971
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10971-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-03-05 – 2023-06-30
Countries
Bangladesh ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10971

Abstract

We propose a field experiment in Dhaka, Bangladesh to identify a novel form of labor market discrimination, "Paternalistic Discrimination," the preferential hiring of male workers to protect female workers from jobs perceived as harmful or difficult. We observe real application and hiring decisions for a night-shift job and experimentally vary whether hiring managers or workers are informed about safe employee transport home, thereby observing both supply and demand responses to perceived increases in female employee welfare.

Experimental design

Employer experiment

We recruit up to 600 "employers", individuals with hiring responsibilities from both businesses in Dhaka, Bangladesh, to be the primary subjects in our experiment. We also construct a worker pool consisting of up to 1,200 men and women aged 18 to 60 who responded to in-person recruitment drives on university campuses about an attractive one-day Excel workshop and job analyzing US stock market data live (7 pm-midnight in Bangladesh).

Each employer is assigned to one out of two transport conditions:
- Transport: Employers are informed that workers will remain in the office for the night shift and will be offered free safe transport home after the shift.
- No Transport: Employers are informed that workers will remain in the office for the night shift and are not informed about any transport.

In addition, employers are cross-randomized into one out of five subsidy conditions:
- No subsidy: Male and female workers receive BDT 1,500 (USD 15) for completing the shift. Employers receive BDT 500 (USD 5) if their hired worker is a man or a woman.
- Male worker subsidy: Male workers receive BDT 2,500 (USD 25) and female workers BDT 1,500 (USD 15) for completing the shift. Employers receive BDT 500 (USD 5) if their hired worker is a man or a woman.
- Female worker subsidy: Male workers receive BDT 1,500 (USD 15) and female workers BDT 2,500 (USD 25) for completing the shift. Employers receive BDT 500 (USD 5) if their hired worker is a man or a woman.
- Male employer subsidy: Male and female workers receive BDT 1,500 (USD 15) for completing the shift. Employers receive BDT 1,500 (USD 15) if their hired worker is a man and BDT 500 (USD 5) if their hired worker is a woman. This meant that employers would still earn more money from hiring male workers even if the male worker would complete zero tasks and the female worker would complete all tasks.
- Female employer subsidy: Male and female workers receive BDT 1,500 (USD 15) for completing the shift. Employers receive BDT 500 (USD 5) if their hired worker is a man and BDT 1,500 (USD 15) if their hired worker is a woman. This meant that employers would still earn more money from hiring female workers even if the female worker would complete zero tasks and the male worker would complete all tasks.

Employers make 10 hiring decisions between pairs of randomly selected potential workers and are informed that one of the decisions will be randomly selected to hire an Excel research assistant. For each potential worker, employers are provided the first name, gender, education, and Excel screening score.

Worker experiment

We recruit up to 1,000 "applicants", men and women aged 18 to 60 who responded to in-person recruitment drives on university campuses about an attractive one-day Excel workshop and job analyzing US stock market data live. To be able to measure selection into the night shift, applicants were only informed about the timing of the workshop and job (7 pm-midnight) after self-selecting into the experiment.

After completing an Excel screening test, applicants are informed that the workshop and job are from 7 pm-midnight and that hired workers receive an Excel certificate of completion and potentially a promotion benefit of BDT 500. To experimentally vary the perceived benefits and costs of the job to interested applicants, applicants are randomized into the following treatments:
1. Benefits:
- Low promotion rate: 10% of workers will be promoted.
- High promotion rate: 90% of workers will be promoted.
2. Costs:
- Transport: Applicants are informed about the safe transport home.
- No transport: Applicants are not informed about the safe transport home.
In both benefit treatment arms, the experimenters serve as the promoters and promote the best X% of workers.

After receiving detailed descriptions of the Excel workshop and job and completing the Excel screening test, we elicit applicants' reservation wages using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). We first ask applicants to choose their reservation wage and then randomly draw a wage between BDT 100 (USD 1) and BDT 5,000 (USD 5).

Design details

Randomization method
Employer experiment: - Transport randomization: Pre-assigned in STATA, stratified by employer industry and worker characteristics. - Subsidy randomization: On the spot by pulling a piece of paper from a bag. Worker experiment: - Transport randomization: Pre-assigned in STATA. - Promotion randomization: On the spot by pulling a piece of paper from a bag.
Randomization unit
Employer experiment: Employers (clustered as we are observing ten hiring decisions per employer). Worker experiment: Workers (not clustered as we are observing only one application decision per worker).
Clusters
Employer experiment: Up to 600 employers. Worker experiment: Up to 1,000 workers.
Observations
Employer experiment: 10 hiring choices or 20 observations per employer. Worker experiment: Up to 1,000 workers.
Arms
Employer experiment: Transport condition: - Transport: 50% - No Transport: 50% Subsidy condition: - No subsidy: 40% - Male worker subsidy: 20% - Female worker subsidy: 20% - Male employer subsidy: 1% - Female employer subsidy: 19% Worker experiment: Benefits: - Low promotion rate: 50% - High promotion rate: 50% Costs: - Transport: 50% - No transport: 50%
Primary outcomes
Our primary outcomes are the share of women hired across treatment arms in the employer experiment and the share of women who applied across treatment arms in the worker experiment.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary outcomes are women's average final Excel assessment score and share of women promoted across treatment arms.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords