Joint Impact of Peer Identity and Behavior on Rule Compliance

How to cite

Goldberg, Jack; Bicchieri, Cristina; Gaechter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Molleman, Lucas. 2023. "Joint Impact of Peer Identity and Behavior on Rule Compliance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010950. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10950-1.3

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Jack Goldberg* , Cristina Bicchieri , Simon Gaechter , Daniele Nosenzo , Lucas Molleman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010950
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10950-1.3
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2023-04-17 – 2023-04-21
Countries
United States of America ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10950

Abstract

The establishment and maintenance of social norms is dependent on the behaviors of one’s reference network. By definition, social norms are behaviors that individuals conform to on the condition that most people in their network conform to the same behavior and also expect the individual to conform to that behavior. The belief that others conform to a behavior, known as empirical expectations, is largely dependent on witnessing that behavior in practice. Therefore, witnessing social norm violation should encourage more social norm violation since the empirical expectation for norm compliance has been reduced. Yet, not all peers in a reference network are equal. Those with lower social distance, or ingroup members, should play a more significant role in shaping one’s willingness to comply with a social norm, both positively and negatively.

In this study we conduct an experiment to probe the interaction between group identity and peer behavior. Social distance is established by having participants identify what they see in a well-known optical illusion (“the dress”), with those who perceive the image the same way being classified into the same peer group. Participants are tasked with either complying with a rule and suffering a financial loss, or violating the rule to earn more money, but only after they witness the behaviors of previous participants. In particular, we look at how group identification may create contrast effects that do not exist in homogeneous groups in case of simple rules. A contrast effect happens when some observed negative behavior focuses subjects on a rule that prescribes the opposite behavior, inducing higher compliance rates when this negative behavior is displayed by an outgroup member than by an ingroup member.

Experimental setup
We randomly assign treatments to participants that vary the number of ingroup/outgroup peers as well as number of rule violators and compliers that they witness. More specifically, we will run treatments with 7 peers, varying the number of violators (0 or 1) and their group identity (ingroup or outgroup). We study the role of minority status in rule compliance, looking for contrast effects. The treatments are herein defined as:

Treatments I: participant has a majority status (Ingroup)
I1: Seven ingroup peers with six who comply and one who violates the rule.
I2: Seven ingroup peers who all comply with the rule.
I3: Six ingroup peers who all comply and one outgroup peer who violates the rule.
I4: Six ingroup peers who all comply and one outgroup peer who complies with the rule.
I5: Six ingroup peers with five who comply, one who violates the rule and one outgroup peer who complies with the rule.

Treatments O: participant has a minority status (Outgroup)
O1: Seven outgroup peers with six who comply and one who violates the rule.
O2: Seven outgroup peers who all comply with the rule.
O3: Six outgroup peers who all comply and one ingroup peer who violates the rule.
O4: Six outgroup peers who all comply and one ingroup peer who complies with the rule.
O5: Six outgroup peers with five who comply, one who violates the rule and one ingroup peer who complies with the rule.

Participants choose to either comply with the rule or to violate it. Violating the rule always leads to higher monetary payoffs. This means that our outcome variable is binary (0=violate; 1=comply with the rule).

Hypotheses
We are interested in our sample’s rate of compliance in response to any of the ten treatments. In what follows, we clarify our main hypotheses in terms of rates of compliance in response to the treatments defined above:

H1: Observing a violation reduces compliance.
Tests:
I1 < I2
I3 < I4
O1 < O2

H2: Compliance reduces more strongly if the violator has higher social proximity (‘ingroup’)
Tests:
I2 – I1 > I4 – I3
I2 – I1 > O2 – O1
O4 - O3 > O2 - O1

H3: Compliance reduces most strongly when the violator is a minority ingroup.
Test: O4 - O3 > I2 - I1

Auxiliary hypotheses:
AH1: I3 > I5. Confirm that the effect expected in H2 is not simply due to a change in the group identity composition but is specific to the “contrast effect”
AH2: O3 > O5. Confirm that the effect expected in H4 is not simply due to a change in the group identity composition.
AH3: I3 > I4. The contrast effect encourages compliance when participants view an outgroup violator.

In sum, we hypothesize that ingroup peers who violate norms will encourage more norm violation than outgroup norm violators will, and ingroup peers who comply will encourage more participant compliance than outgroup compliance will.

Experimental design

Participants, who are recruited online, begin by reading an introduction page where they are told what tasks they will be doing and the amount of time they should expect to take. Next they will identify the color of a dress that is presented to them. The dress is a well known optical phenomenon where some see it as gold and white, and some see it as blue and black. This will define their peer identity group. Those who see the dress the same color as the participant are the in-group and those who see it differently are the out-group. Participants are given instructions and complete a comprehension check.
Next, the participant is given a rule for what decision to make. The rule can be either to turn left or right. Then, the participant is shown a forked road that splits to the left and right. The participant then sees the behavior of previous participants. We randomly assign treatments to participants that vary the number of ingroup/outgroup peers as well as number of rule violators and compliers. The participant then makes a decision to go left or right. Again, each option is associated with a payoff of either $0.5 or $1.
Participants finish the study by offering their gender, age, and feedback, then are informed of their final payoff, including participation fee and bonus.

Design details

Randomization method
All randomization is pseudo-randomly generated using a javascript math library. Treatments are assigned iteratively to participants based on their order of arrival.
Randomization unit
The unit of randomization is individual. Each participant is randomly assigned a treatment without group level clusters.
Clusters
7000 participants.
Observations
7000 participants.
Arms
7000 observations per treatment.
Primary outcomes
The key outcome variable of interest in this experiment is participant compliance with a given rule.

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Keywords