Religiosity, supernatural beliefs and economic behavior: Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in Bangladesh

How to cite

Pondorfer, Andreas; Ahmed, Firoz. 2023. "Religiosity, supernatural beliefs and economic behavior: Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in Bangladesh." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010944. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10944-1.1

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Andreas Pondorfer* , Firoz Ahmed

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010944
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10944-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2023-03-10 – 2023-04-20
Countries
Private
JEL codes
O12, Z12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10944

Abstract

Belief in supernatural beliefs is widespread across countries and pervasive in the daily life of many people. Previous empirical evidence has focused on the relationship of supernatural beliefs and prosocial behavior (e.g., Gershman 2016, 2021; Le Rossignol et al. 2022). Yet, empirical evidence on the relationship between supernatural beliefs, individual and social risk preferences, and honest behavior is missing. These outcomes are fundamental for economic development and many economic decisions such as investment decisions, occupational choices, and health behavior. In this project, we investigate the causal effect of supernatural beliefs on individual risk taking, social risk taking, honest behavior and associated perceived social norms. To do so, we conduct a lab-in-the field experiment in rural Bangladesh. Our experiment consists of a control group and two treatment groups where participants are asked to donate money to agents who are believed to have supernatural powers. In a second project, we investigate reputational concerns when donating money to those agents.

Intervention

We study the effect of supernatural beliefs on individual risk taking, social risk taking and honest behavior. Participants take part in a lab-in-the field experiment and will be randomly assigned across control and treatment groups. In the treatment groups, participants can voluntary donate an endowment given by the experimenters to local people who are believed to have supernatural powers. We hypothesize that activating beliefs in the existence of supernatural powers through voluntary donations significantly affect behavioural outcomes.

Experimental design

Before the experiments start, all participants receive a show-up fee (see Experimental Protocol for details).

Measuring risk preferences and honest behavior
We measure risk preferences by using the elicitation method of Gneezy and Potters (1997). Participants are asked to allocate the amount x between a save option and a risky option (3x). To study social risk taking, we focus on two aspects: positive correlated risk (PCR) and negative correlated risk (NCR). Active participants will be randomly matched with a passive and anonymous player (from another village). In PCR (NCR), the passive player receives the same (the opposite) payment. This leads to the situation where higher risks in the PCR do not influence the equality between the active and passive player (as both receive the same amount), while higher risk taking in NCR is increasing inequality as one player will gain the high amount while the other will gain the low one. We follow a within-subject design: Participants will make three decisions: They always start with the individual decision, followed by PCR and NCR (the order for PCR and NCR will be randomized).

We measure honest behavior by using the Resource Allocation Game (RAG) (Hruschka et al. 2014, Lowes et al. 2017). In this game, participants play in private with 10 tokens, two envelopes and a fair dice with three sides of black color and threes sides of white color. Participants are asked to allocate each token to one of the two envelope. First, they mentally choose one of the envelopes and then roll the die. If one colored side comes up, players are instructed to put the coin into the envelope they mentally chose. If the other color appears, players are instructed to put the token into the opposite envelope from the one they chose. Participants chose between an envelope for themselves and an envelope assigned to a passive and anonymous player (from another village that is adjacent to them).

We follow a within-subject design: Both games are played by all participants. The order of the two games is fixed. People start with the investment game, followed by the RAG. In total, we have 12 different set of protocols (see attachment).

Treatment variation 1: Activating supernatural beliefs
To study the effect of supernatural beliefs on behavioral outcomes, we will implement a control condition (C) and two treatments (T1P and T2G) in a between subject design. In the two treatments, participants can voluntarily donate an endowment (money) given by the experimenters to local agents who are believed to have supernatural powers - the Pir (T1P) or the Gunin (T2G). Before we start with the explanations of the game in the individual sessions, we put the donation in an envelope labelled with the name of local supernatural agents. People will be told that at the end when they have made all their decisions, this donation will be given on behalf of them to the to the local supernatural agent. We also inform them that we ask for their consent about their donation at the end of the games. During the whole time of the session, the envelope will be visible in front of the participant. When the participants have made all their decisions, they will be asked to donate the endowment to the local supernatural agent or give it back to the experimenter (where the money comes from). To collect additional information about donation decisions, participants in the control group (C) will also be asked to donate a given endowment to the local supernatural agent or give it back to the experimenter. However, the donation decision will only be presented at the end of the session.

Treatment variation 2: Public vs private donation decision
To study social image/reputational concerns related to the donations, at the end of their session participants will make the donation decision either in private or in public (i.e., when the research assistant is watching). In each condition of treatment variation 1 (C, T1P, and T2G), participants will be randomly assigned to either the public or private condition. Note that half of the observations in the control group will be asked to donate to Pir, while the other half will be asked to donate money to the Gunin (see also Table 1 below). The public vs private donation decision will be evaluated as a separate treatment variation.
 
Eliciting social norms
For each behavioral outcome, we elicit social norms. All norm questions will be incentivized (people receive payment for correct guesses). For all decisions we elicit descriptive norms by asking respondents how much they believe other community members invested (risk game) / allocated to the other person (RAG). For injunctive norms, we applied the following elicitation method. For the risk game, we first ask all participants what they think is the amount which should be invested. In a second question, we first inform participants that we’ll know the answers to this first question at the end of day. We subsequently ask them what they think is the amount that most other people report to the first question. Thus, the first question reveals personal normative beliefs, while the second question gives us injunctive norms. For the RAG, we present participants the following scenario: they should assume that out of 10 times, 5 times the color that allocated money to them shows up. Next, we ask them the following five questions: how socially acceptable is it to allocate money 5 (6, 7, 8, 9 10) times to yourself? Social acceptability is measured on a 4-point scale ranging from very socially unacceptable, somewhat socially unacceptable, socially acceptable, very socially acceptable. In a second question, we inform participants that we know the answers to this first question at the end of day. We subsequently ask them what they think what category was chosen by most others in their community. This method is comparable to the elicitation approach of Krupka and Weber (2013).

After the experiments, we collect additional information in a post-experimental questionnaire (see below). We collect information on religious beliefs, religiosity, supernatural beliefs, trust, conformism, confidence, relatedness, envy, zero sum thinking, trust, financial activities and socio-demographic characteristics.

Design details

Randomization method
The randomization of villages will be done by computer. A random shuffle (lottery) will assign participants to treatments.
Randomization unit
Village level The randomization of villages will be done by computer. We randomly select 10 Union Parishads (UPs) across three Upazilas (sub-districts) in the area of Khulna and Satkhira. Next, we randomly select two villages per UPs for our study. Individuals We will invite people by door-to-door visit. Four enumerators will simultaneously start selecting households from four sides (north, south, west and east). Every third household will be targeted, and an adult member will be asked to participate in the study. We start with recruiting a male member. In the next household a female member will be recruited (and so on). Thus, we aim to have a balanced sample in terms of gender (50 % males, 50 % females). If a male (female) participant denies, enumerators will go to the next nearest household and will invite a male (female) person. As 90 % of the population in Bangladesh are Muslim and Pir and Gunin are more common within Islam, we restrict our sample to Muslims (i.e., Hindus are not selected for the experiments).
Clusters
20 villages
Observations
About 720 participants across 20 villages (36 participants per village)
Arms
Control group: 240 participants T1P: 240 participants T2G: 240 participants
Primary outcomes
Risk preferences Individual risk taking (IR): the amount invested in the risky option (ranges between 0 and 10) Risk taking in PCR: the amount invested in the risky option (ranges between 0 and 10) Risk taking in NCR: the amount invested in the risky option (ranges between 0 and 10) For each of the three variables above, we compute a respective dummy variable which takes on the value of one if people chose the equal split (5), and zero otherwise. We also investigate extreme risk taking (risk aversion) by computing a dummy variable which take on the 1 if people chose 10 (0) in the risky option and zero otherwise. To compare the effect of supernatural beliefs on social risk taking, we further compute the following variables: delta_IR_PCR: amount invested in PCR - amount invested in IR delta_IR_NCR: amount invested in NCR - amount invested in IR delta_IR_PCR_d: share of equal split in PCR - share of equal split in IR delta_IR_NCR_d: share of equal split in NCR - share of equal split in IR The same share is constructed for extreme risk taking (risk aversion) RAG The amount allocated to the other person (ranges between 0 and 10). Religious donation Donation: Binary variable which takes on the value of one if participants donated to Pir or Gunin, and zero if the money was given back to the university. Donation to Pir: Binary variable which takes on the value of one if participants donated to Pir, and zero if the money was given back to the university. Donation to Gunin: Binary variable which takes on the value of one if participants donated to Gunin, and zero if the money was given back to the university. Social norms Descriptive norms investment games and RAG: value between 0 and 10 Injunctive norms in investment games: value between 0 and 10 Socially acceptability in RAG: 4-point scale ranging from very socially unacceptable, somewhat socially unacceptable, socially acceptable, very socially acceptable.

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Keywords