The Equilibrium Effects of Public Spending in Education

How to cite

Karachiwalla, Naureen; Andrabi, Tahir; Bau, Natalie; Das, Jishnu; Khwaja, Asim. 2023. "The Equilibrium Effects of Public Spending in Education." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010904. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10904-1.1

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Naureen Karachiwalla* , Tahir Andrabi , Natalie Bau , Jishnu Das , Asim Khwaja

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010904
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10904-1.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2003-01-01 – 2011-12-31
Countries
Pakistan (Punjab)
JEL codes
O12, O15, H44, H52, I22, I25, I28
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10904

Abstract

We estimate the equilibrium effects of a public school grant program administered through school councils in Pakistani villages with multiple public and private schools and clearly defined catchment boundaries. The program was randomized at the village-level, allowing us to estimate its causal impact on the market. Four years after the start of the program, test scores were 0.2 sd higher in public schools. We find evidence of an education multiplier: test scores in private schools were also 0.2 sd higher in treated markets. Consistent with standard models of product differentiation, the education multiplier is greater for those private schools that faced a greater threat to their market power. Accounting for private sector responses increases the program's cost-effectiveness by 85% and affects how a policymaker would target spending. Given that markets with several public and private schools are now pervasive in low- and middle-income countries, prudent policy requires us to account for private sector responses to public policy, both in their design and in their evaluation.

Intervention

The study was initiated by the Government of Punjab as a pilot program of grants to public schools administered through school-level bodies called school councils. The program had two components -- providing grants to schools and revitalizing school councils. The school grant portion of the program provided public schools with a large, fungible infusion of cash (equivalent to almost 15% of a typical school's operating budget). Under the program, schools created a list of their needs working with a well-established and highly reputable NGO, the National Rural Support Program (NRSP), and submitted funding requests to the district.

The school councils component of the program reflected a revised 2007 policy that encouraged more frequent meetings and required greater inclusion of parents with children enrolled in the school, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. School councils were required to work with NRSP and were also encouraged to discuss teacher attendance and performance, child attendance and dropout, as well as general problems faced by the school in regular meetings. Of particular interest is that the policy specifically allowed and encouraged councils to hire additional teachers on a temporary basis.

Experimental design

The sample is drawn from two districts in Punjab, Pakistan: Attock and Faisalabad. All villages in the sample had at least one private school. Following an intention to treat protocol, the government and NRSP would implement the program in at least 80% of the villages that were identified as ``treatment'' in these two districts and would not implement the program in the villages that were identified as control. Eighty sample villages were selected from a sample list of a larger project, the Learning and Educational Achievements in Pakistani Schools (LEAPS) and half were randomly assigned to treatment, stratified at the district-level. Every village in our sample is a closed educational market with schools' potential competitors and household's potential choice sets clearly defined.

Data were collected each year for four years from 2003-2004 to 2006-2007, and then again in 2011. Data collection in each round included school-based surveys and household surveys. In every year of data collection, a list of all schools within a 15 minute walk from the perimeter of the village was compiled and school entry or exit was recorded. Then, data were collected from each school from all teachers and the school principal/owner, and children were tested using low-stakes tests.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Village
Clusters
80 villages
Observations
460 schools
Arms
40 villages treatment, 40 villages control
Primary outcomes
Average school-level grade 4 student test scores, primary school enrollment, private school fees, number of private schools in a village, number of private schools opening in a village, likelihood of a private school closing
Secondary outcomes
At the school level: log student-teacher ratio, number of contract teachers, proportion of teachers with a Bachelor's degree or above, proportion of teachers with some teacher training, log teacher salary, school facilities indices.
Sponsors
Name: Research on Improving Systems in Education program, funded by UK Aid Location: London, UK Url: https://riseprogramme.org

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Keywords