New Pay: An experimental analysis of self-set pay and social comparisons

How to cite

Schumacher, Stefanie. 2023. "New Pay: An experimental analysis of self-set pay and social comparisons." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010897. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10897-1.0

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Stefanie Schumacher*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010897
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10897-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-01-31 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10897

Abstract

New work demands for new pay, and while still many companies are hesitant to change their traditional incentive practices, more and more pioneering companies are experimenting with new forms of pay. One such new pay model incorporates the idea that employees can determine their own salaries. First studies examining the causal implications of self-set pay show higher effort provision, but also document relatively high wage levels.

Even though self-set pay can be, per definition, decided for individually, information about peer performance might still be highly relevant. The main goal of this online study is to examine the influence of performance comparison on self-set wages and to vary whether people are informed about the average output that was generated by others working on the same task. Specifically, the chosen wage levels are analyzed and also the proportion of the participants selecting the highest wage in both conditions (with and without peer performance comparison). Furthermore, I analyze the effect of delegating decision-rights to employees on effort provision by running two treatments with fixed pay, allowing comparison of performance under self-selected versus fixed wages in the same task.

Experimental design

The study is conducted online with four treatments. In all treatments, participants receive a base pay for participating (1 GBP) and an additional payment for working on a real-effort task (encryption task). In the two main treatments, participants can self-select their wage within a pre-defined wage band. In treatment 1, participants are informed upfront that they will first work on the task, second, they will see their performance, and third they will determine their own wage. The wage they set will be implemented and paid out after the study. The only difference in treatment 2 is that participants will additionally be informed about the average output generated by other workers working on the same task. This information is gathered in a pre-study, where participants face the same conditions as in the self-set wage treatments. Pre-collecting this information allows random assignment to all four treatment conditions in the main data collection phase.

Treatments 3 and 4 allow a comparison of effort provision under two different fixed wages to the treatments with self-set wages. One treatment offers a "great" salary (1 GBP), and one offers a salary that represents the upper bound of the self-set wage band of T1 and T2 (2 GBP).

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization is done by a computer. Every participant who clicks on the study link is randomly assigned to one of the four treament conditions. As more observations will be gathered in T1 and T2, the allocation ratio is 1/3 for the fixed pay and 2/3 for the self-selected wages treatments.
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
n=480 individuals We will exclude subjects who do not complete the study within 44 minutes of starting and who are not approved for any other reason. We will analyze the data both, for all participants and for those participants, who solve at least one task correctly in the working stage. We will exclude participants who do not manage to solve the practice questions in 3 trials or answer the question on the payment scheme wrong twice or more times.
Observations
n=480 individuals
Arms
Approximately n=160 in T1 and T2 (each) and n=80 in T3 and T4 (each).
Primary outcomes
- Wage level chosen in T1 and in T2 (between 0 and 2 GBP, in 10 cents increments). - Proportion of people choosing the maximum wage in T1 and T2 (max. wage is 2 GBP). - Effort provision in all four treatments (number of correctly solved words; comparing the data from T1 + T2 to T3 and to T4 (self-set salaries vs. fixed wages)).
Secondary outcomes
For T1 and T2 only: - Wage levels and wage choices of low performers. - Wage levels and wage choices of high performers. This is analyzed by looking at the two groups (high / low) and by looking at the interaction effect between effort and treatment (dependent variable = wage level)

Cited by

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Keywords