New Pay: An experimental analysis of self-set pay and social comparisons
How to cite
Schumacher, Stefanie. 2023. "New Pay: An experimental analysis of self-set pay and social comparisons." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010897. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10897-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
New work demands for new pay, and while still many companies are hesitant to change their traditional incentive practices, more and more pioneering companies are experimenting with new forms of pay. One such new pay model incorporates the idea that employees can determine their own salaries. First studies examining the causal implications of self-set pay show higher effort provision, but also document relatively high wage levels.
Even though self-set pay can be, per definition, decided for individually, information about peer performance might still be highly relevant. The main goal of this online study is to examine the influence of performance comparison on self-set wages and to vary whether people are informed about the average output that was generated by others working on the same task. Specifically, the chosen wage levels are analyzed and also the proportion of the participants selecting the highest wage in both conditions (with and without peer performance comparison). Furthermore, I analyze the effect of delegating decision-rights to employees on effort provision by running two treatments with fixed pay, allowing comparison of performance under self-selected versus fixed wages in the same task.
Experimental design
The study is conducted online with four treatments. In all treatments, participants receive a base pay for participating (1 GBP) and an additional payment for working on a real-effort task (encryption task). In the two main treatments, participants can self-select their wage within a pre-defined wage band. In treatment 1, participants are informed upfront that they will first work on the task, second, they will see their performance, and third they will determine their own wage. The wage they set will be implemented and paid out after the study. The only difference in treatment 2 is that participants will additionally be informed about the average output generated by other workers working on the same task. This information is gathered in a pre-study, where participants face the same conditions as in the self-set wage treatments. Pre-collecting this information allows random assignment to all four treatment conditions in the main data collection phase.
Treatments 3 and 4 allow a comparison of effort provision under two different fixed wages to the treatments with self-set wages. One treatment offers a "great" salary (1 GBP), and one offers a salary that represents the upper bound of the self-set wage band of T1 and T2 (2 GBP).
Design details
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