Service quality and performance of sales agencies
How to cite
Gürtler, Oliver; Heinz, Matthias; Schäfer, Kai; Sliwka, Dirk; Thon, Max. 2023. "Service quality and performance of sales agencies." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010859. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10859-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The RCT will be conducted with a leading travel company and tour operator in Germany. The firm sells its products online but also through a large number of mostly independently owned travel agencies. These travel agencies work together with several tour operators and the respective tour operators pay the agencies through commissions typically set once a year. Common commission payments are defined as percentages of sales.
In our study, the treated agencies receive priority access to a service hotline that they can consult in case of booking changes, inquiries, or
customer complaints for specific target destinations. Our goal is to investigate whether higher service quality affects the selling behavior of the travel agents.
Experimental design
The RCT will be conducted with a leading travel company and tour operator in Germany. The firm sells its products online but also through a large number of mostly independently owned travel agencies. These travel agencies work together with several tour operators and the respective tour operators pay the agencies through commissions typically set once a year. Common commission payments are defined as percentages of sales.
Presently, the travel company thus uses monetary incentives to motivate selling activities of the travel agencies. Our study asks whether the agencies' selling behavior can also be affected by providing them with a better service. We consider a treatment, in which the treated agencies receive priority access to a service hotline that they can consult in case of booking changes, inquiries, or customer complaints for specific target destinations (Egypt, Greece, Spain, and UAE). We compare the performance (as measured by revenue and the number of bookings) in the treatment group to that in a control group of unaffected agencies.
Moreover, we conduct surveys within the agencies to inquire, among other things, about owners' and sales agents' satisfaction with the priority access to the service hotline. We also document the number of calls to the hotline. This allows us to study whether the agencies made use of the better service opportunities.
To understand underlying behavioral mechanisms we consider potential heterogenous treatment effects in several dimensions such as the agencies’ total number of past bookings at the study firm, their baseline commission levels paid by the study firm, the prior total number of bookings to the targeted destinations, the "tightness" with which the agencies are linked to other tour operators (e.g. because of competitors’ incentive contracts, ownership, long-term cooperation, premium access to competitors' products and services). We will also study heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the existing incentives systems within the agencies (i.e., the incentives for employees implemented by the agency owner).
We conduct two other RCTs in collaboration with the travel company during the same time frame (see the respective pre-registrations for details on the other experiments), and the control group used in this experiment will also serve as a control group in these other RCTs. The other RCTs introduce additional monetary incentives.
Design details
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