The impact of different monetary incentives on the individual ability to enhance physical activity and goal attainment: A within-subject field experiment

How to cite

Mertins, Vanessa; Hiller, Maximilian; Kwasniok, Devin; Wübbelmann, Cheyenne. 2023. "The impact of different monetary incentives on the individual ability to enhance physical activity and goal attainment: A within-subject field experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010814. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10814-1.0

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Vanessa Mertins* , Maximilian Hiller , Devin Kwasniok , Cheyenne Wübbelmann

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010814
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10814-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2023-01-23 – 2023-02-26
Countries
Germany ()
JEL codes
C93, D91, I12
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10814

Abstract

Previous research has shown that monetary incentives often have little or no effect on subjects' health behaviors. This lack of effect in the aggregate is despite the fact that many people believe incentives help them, and contrary to the fact that many have also been shown to adjust their behavior. Also, as more and more health programs involving money are offered, we see it as a necessity to find out which individuals will increase their physical activity if they can receive small amounts of money upon reaching an individual step goal.

To this end, we have developed a within-subject randomized controlled trial design in which each participant will serve as his/her own control. About 500 participants, aged 18 to 85 years with daily steps ranging from 1,285 to 84,942, will receive four experimental treatments and a control treatment during the same 5-weeks session in a randomized order (i.e. each condition on 7 days). For each individual, we want to learn the optimum incentive design (bonus or deposit contract) and whether the prospect of higher pay leads subjects to increase their daily step count beyond the individual target (i.e., median) toward the value of the best 40% of days or even best 25% of days. We are also interested in finding out which types of subjects do not respond to these incentives at all.

We run the experiment within an ongoing 365-day long study whit subjects who all aim at improving their physical activity. All those participants have been positively health screened, are using a smartphone app (ActiVAtE Behavior) to transmit their steps (main performance measure) in a timely manner and have already provided extensive individual data at time of intervention. While all participants indicated in the application questionnaire that they were eager to walk more steps per day, there is a large variation in ex-ante daily steps submitted via a smartphone app over the past 9 months. Since the individual daily goal is based on the median (minus data below 1,000 steps/day), there is also respective variation in individual goals, ranging from 1,285 to 21,690 steps/day. Furthermore, we have a very rich dataset on each individual that includes not only activity data before, during, and after the intervention, but also a large variety of preferences (measured via economic laboratory experiments) as well as sociodemographic data and individual attitudes and self-reported behavior (measured via questionnaires).

Intervention

T0: Control
T1: Small reward
T2: Small reward plus extension
T3: Small bet
T4: Small bet plus extension

In T0, no incentive is present. In T1, we offer participants a reward: if they reach their individual step goal, they earn a fixed bonus of 0.25€, independent of the specific step value. In the T2 treatment, participants are offered the same as in T1 plus the opportunity to earn more if they exceed their initial goal: 0.35€ if goal2 (value achieved on the best 40% of days) is reached, full bonus of 0.50€ is paid if goal3 (=value achieved on the best 25% of days) is reached. The T3 treatment is similar to T1 with the exception that participants who fail to reach their goal have to pay 0.50€ of their initial start-up fee if they have not opted out from the bet until the day before at the latest. T4 equals T2 with the exception that, again, a deposit contract applied with participants who do not reach their daily step goal have to pay 0.50€ to us if they have not opted out from the bet in time.
Prior to the start of the 5-week intervention, each participant will receive their individual step goal and a chart indicating for each calendar day of the next 5 weeks which treatment will apply on that day.

Experimental design

We apply a within-subjects design to test the effects of different monetary incentives on physical activity and individual goal achievement. Physical activity is measured as number of steps per day transmitted via a smartphone app. The individual goal is calculated by the median transmitted steps during the previous 9-month baseline phase. Participants will undergo all treatments in a different order so that at each time point each treatment is present. The treatments will change daily. Participants are told their individual goal before intervention start. This goal is fixed. Each participant will face the following treatments:
T0: Control
T1: Small reward
T2: Small reward plus extension
T3: Small bet
T4: Small bet plus extension

In T0, no incentive is present. In T1, we offer participants a reward: if they reach their individual step goal, they earn a fixed bonus of 0.25€, independent of the specific step value. In the T2 treatment, participants are offered the same as in T1 plus the opportunity to earn more if they exceed their initial goal: 0.35€ if goal2 (value achieved on the best 40% of days) is reached, full bonus of 0.50€ is paid if goal3 (=value achieved on the best 25% of days) is reached. The T3 treatment is similar to T1 with the exception that participants who fail to reach their goal have to pay 0.50€ of their initial start-up fee if they have not opted out from the bet until the day before at the latest. T4 equals T2 with the exception that, again, a deposit contract applied with participants who do not reach their daily step goal have to pay 0.50€ to us if they have not opted out from the bet in time.
Prior to the start of the 5-week intervention, each participant will receive their individual step goal and a chart indicating for each calendar day of the next 5 weeks which treatment will apply on that day.

Design details

Randomization method
Random draw by computer
Randomization unit
Randomization will be at the individual level
Clusters
500
Observations
500
Arms
500
Primary outcomes
steps per day, goal achievement (# of successful days), degree of target achievement
Secondary outcomes
take up rates, average costs per treatment, individual costs per goal

Cited by

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Keywords