Pushing on a String? Price Interventions to Reduce Theft in Pakistan’s Power Sector
How to cite
Naeem, Muhammad Usman; Dobermann, Tim; Hayat, Faraz; Greenstone, Michael; Burgess, Robin. 2023. "Pushing on a String? Price Interventions to Reduce Theft in Pakistan’s Power Sector." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010777. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10777-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Our study tests how prices and the availability of outside options like off-grid solar alter theft decisions in rural Pakistan. We begin by documenting Pakistan’s highly sophisticated electricity theft landscape. Despite growing government enforcement efforts, households in many areas still steal liberally. They demonstrate complex evasive behaviours such as running assets on different meters, bunching at key tariff thresholds while using illegal lines for excess consumption, or frequently switching between solar and illegal consumption. The experiment explores these dynamics directly by introducing block-by-block subsidies to measure the price elasticities of demand and theft (unpaid bills and illegal connections). The introduction of block-by-block subsidies enables for more accurate estimation of demand elasticities compared to prevailing estimates that ignore the non-linear tariff structure. We also estimate a novel elasticity of electricity theft with respect to the price. By introducing subsidies, we change the set of relative prices between grid, solar, and illegal connections, enabling us to study the substitution dynamics between these competing technologies for accessing electricity. This study is a product of sustained collaboration with the Government of Pakistan over the past four years. They remain the primary stakeholder and facilitator of this research.
Intervention
This experiment takes place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a rural and poor province of Pakistan with extremely high levels of theft. A recently conducted village census of 2500 households reveals stark facts. Nearly 15% of households never paid any amount of their bill in the past year. Conditional on paying something, average bill recovery remains staggeringly low at 59%. 30% of metered households also have an illegal connection, while 35% also have a solar panel. Substantial bunching is observed at key price thresholds, indicating consumers are salient to price changes and make deliberate adjustments to lower their bills. The electricity theft landscape is therefore highly sophisticated.
Our first goal is to understand how sensitive demand and theft is to the price of electricity. Our experiment will cover 1700 households across 75 villages. We will introduce a 30% per unit subsidy at three different blocks in the non-linear tariff schedule (or the supply curve). Providing within-bin subsidies shifts different segments of the supply curve, which allows us to estimate elasticities for those who consume in the different segments. The subsidy will last for six months. Mean metered consumption varies between 120-140 units/month depending on the season.
A. 0-100 units [340 households]
B. 101-200 units [340 households]
C. 201-300 units [340 households]
D. 0-300 units [340 households]
E. Control [340 households]
This setup will enable us to capture the non-linear budget set that exists in Pakistan’s power sector. When calculating bills, households get the benefit of the previous block only, generating discrete jumps in both the average price and marginal price schedule. A household in group B that consumes 50 units will receive no subsidy, while a household which consumes 250 units will receive a 30% discount on its consumption between 101-200 units.
Experimental design
From our completed census of 2500 households, we will first conduct a baseline survey of 1700 households. Prior to baseline a household will be assigned into one of the four treatment groups or into control. We will stratify at the distribution feeder level. We notify a household about their treatment status at the end of the survey and verify that they understand precisely how their subsidy will be calculated. We will notify households that this subsidy will last for six months. Payments to households are delivered each month in person in cash along with an explanation that spells out how the end subsidy amount was calculated.
Design details
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