Incentives for Safety: A Field Experiment in the Ugandan Transit Industry

How to cite

Raisaro, Claude. 2023. "Incentives for Safety: A Field Experiment in the Ugandan Transit Industry." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010753. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10753-1.0

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Claude Raisaro*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010753
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10753-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-12-05 – 2023-06-30
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10753

Abstract

The global road safety epidemic, with 1.35 million fatalities annually and 90\% occurring in developing countries, has become a critical issue for economic development. This study investigates the effectiveness of contracts in reducing speeding behavior among motor taxi drivers in urban Uganda. Given the informal and semiformal clustering of workers in this setting, the research design varies the type and visibility to peers belonging to the same cluster of monetary incentives offered to drivers and assesses their impact on driving behavior, labor market outcomes, contract demand, and the environment. The use of GPS technology enables the collection of high-frequency driving behavior data, which serves as the basis for designing credible contracts and observing behavior during and after the contract period.

Experimental design

360 motor-taxi drivers, all operating from different taxi stations in the metropolitan area of Kampala, Uganda, are randomly assigned to receive an offer to access financial incentives for ten days. Each respondent is asked to answer a phone survey every two days for a time period of two weeks.

Participants were randomly assigned to three treatment groups with the following goals. First, a sub-sample is offered financial incentives to reduce speed excess; to control for income effects, the remaining part of the sample is offered a flat payment regardless of the driving behavior. Second, to study the impact of financial incentives that can be used to counter peer pressure, for a subset of respondents, the financial incentive offer is publicly disclosed to the peers working at the same taxi station.

Data on participants' behavior is collected in two ways: a) a brief phone survey is administered right before, during, and after exposure to treatment; b) a free-of-charge GPS tracker was installed in the motorbikes of all participants approximately two months before the intervention.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by computer
Randomization unit
Individual (respondent)
Clusters
360 respondents (cluster)
Observations
3600 observations (respondent-day)
Arms
550 observations (55 clusters) in arm "Flat payment" 1800 observations (180 clusters) in arm "Private contract" 1250 observations (125 clusters) in arm "Public excuse contract"
Primary outcomes
Driving behavior: - Dummy variable indicating whether a speeding violation (driving above 50 kph) has been committed in a given day - Average excess speed in a given day Labor market outcomes: - earnings - labor supply - productivity
Secondary outcomes
Demand for commitment: - Dummy variable indicating whether respondent picks a dominated contract - Willingness to pay for the contract Labor market outcomes: - share of recurrent customers - number of new contacts from customers Driving behavior: - Air pollutant emissions: carbon footprint - Expected average fine

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Keywords