Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma
How to cite
Lippert, Steffen; Feess, Eberhard; Tremewan, James; Martini-Tibbs, Jamie. 2022. "Leadership and cooperation in a sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010663. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10663-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We analyze theoretically and with an online experiment on Prolific the impact of leadership in a sequential Prisoners' Dilemma. In the exogenous treatment E, one of the two subjects is randomly assigned to the role of the first mover (FM), and the other two the role of second mover (SM). In the transparent treatment T, one of the two subjects (the principal) is asked to decide between the role as FM and SM. The other subject (the agent) is informed about the principal's decision. In the opaque treatment O, the principal is also asked to decide between the role as FM and SM, but the agent is not informed that the order of moves depends on the principal's choice. We have developed a behavioral game theoretical model where subjects have private information on the weight they put on the payoff of their partner in case they cooperate. Our model yields predictions for the impact of the treatments on (i) the principal's choice (for treatments T and O), the frequency of cooperating FMs, and the frequency of SMs who cooperate after the FM has cooperated.
Experimental design
We have three treatments:
In the exogenous treatment E, one of the two subjects is randomly assigned to the role of the first mover (FM), and the other two the role of second mover (SM).
In the transparent treatment T, one of the two subjects (the principal) is asked to decide between the role as FM and SM. The other subject (the agent) is informed about the principal’s decision.
In the opaque treatment O, the principal is also asked to decide between the role as FM and SM, but the agent is not informed that the order of moves depends on the principal’s choice.
In all treatments, we apply the strategy method for SMs, that is, they are asked for their choices conditional on whether the FM cooperated or not. Principals as SM in treatments T and O are asked for this only after they have self selected to the role as FM or SM.
Each subject plays only one role, that is, we apply a between-subject design.
Design details
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