Commitment to Safety: A Demand Experiment from the Ugandan Transit Industry
How to cite
Raisaro, Claude. 2023. "Commitment to Safety: A Demand Experiment from the Ugandan Transit Industry." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010635. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10635-1.3
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
This project investigates the demand for commitment and the role of peer pressure in shaping the uptake of commitment contracts for safe driving. I propose that such contracts can serve as a justification for evading the social norm of speeding, thereby mitigating the status signaling aspect of driving fast. To test this mechanism, I design a demand experiment using GPS technology to offer contracts providing monetary rewards for safe driving. By manipulating the conditions under which the contracts are offered, I aim to quantify the demand for incentives to drive safely and to test whether the possibility to use the contract as a justification to drive slow influences the uptake of these contracts.
Experimental design
Respondents choose between two daily contracts offered for a period of ten days: (i) a flat payment contract regardless of the driving behavior (UCT), or (ii) performance-based contract that pays more if no speeding violations occur. A speeding violation is defined as surpassing 50 kph in urban areas of Kampala, according to the GPS device installed in the respondent's motorbike.
Each choice is made under one of the following regimes:
(1) T1 private regime: all choices and the offer of the contract are kept private;
(2) T2 public excuse regime: choices are made privately; the respondent is informed that the contract offered will be made public to his peers;
(3) T3 public with no excuse regime: the respondent is informed that (a) the contract offered will be made public to his peers and (b) the forgone alternative payment (UCT if performance contract picked or vice versa) will also be made public to the peers.
Peers are defined as co-workers operating from the same taxi station.
Under a given regime, each respondent takes nine consecutive choices (henceforth, a set of choices) between the performance-based contract and a UCT. More details are provided below. An additional choice between two fixed payments is also provided.
Each respondent is informed that only one of the choices will be picked at random. Their preferred contract for the randomly picked binary choice (performance vs UCT) will be offered. To maintain incentive compatibility for all binary choices, the respondent is informed that a positive probability to be selected is assigned to all binary choices in the set.
Each respondent is asked to make three sets of binary choice under the three regimes, plus the flat payment vs flat payment choice, for a total of 30 binary choice. The order of the exposure to the regimes is randomized. I exploit both within and across-respondent variation. I intend to run two analysis: one considers the answers to the first regime each respondent is exposed to; the second analysis exploits within-subject variation and controls for the order of exposure to the three regimes. I intend to verify differential treatment by income (above/below median) and pressure by peers at the workplace to drive fast (measures collected in AEARCTR-0010625).
Design details
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