Using Contests to Deliver Cost-Effective Energy Conservation in Vietnam

How to cite

Yoder, Elizabeth; Garg, Teevrat; Lemus, Jorge; Marshall, Guillermo; Ta, Chi. 2022. "Using Contests to Deliver Cost-Effective Energy Conservation in Vietnam." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010592. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10592-1.0

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Elizabeth Yoder* , Teevrat Garg , Jorge Lemus , Guillermo Marshall , Chi Ta

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010592
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10592-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-12-06 – 2023-06-01
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10592

Abstract

The energy sector in low- and middle-income countries is characterized by two stylized facts: (a) higher rates of particulate and carbon emissions per unit electricity generated and (b) low aggregate energy production resulting in lack of access and reliability of electricity. These concerns have led policy makers to encourage energy conservation in urban households through a variety of programs including tiered pricing, behavioral nudges, and direct “bonus” payments to keep energy use below a target maximum.

Urban energy conservation could help address the problem of grid balancing, that is reducing peak demand, especially as LMICs (including Vietnam where we propose our study) transition to a larger share of their electricity being generated from renewable resources. This is crucial to achieving the emissions reduction promise of renewable energy.

However, the issue of incentivizing agents (households) to exert costly, unobservable effort (energy abatement) is a long-standing and open question in economics. In many settings, including ours, the principal (utility) observes a performance measure (energy use) correlated with agent’s effort but not the effort directly because the principal is unable to observe shocks beyond the control of the agent (e.g. weather, household demand shock). One possible solution is to use rank-ordered tournaments that incentivize relative performance, thereby obviating the need for the principal to observe common shocks. In this project, we draw on a rich theoretical and nascent empirical literature on contracts and rank-ordered tournaments to test what features of tournaments are best suited to encourage greater conservation.

Experimental design

Through our partnership with the utility, we will send emails and text messages to all households in Hanoi (~2 million), encouraging them to sign up for an energy game with the potential to win meaningful sums of money (as determined by local context). Households will be given a web link to sign up for the utility’s mobile app and will be required to answer a short survey, which will serve as our baseline survey. Once we have the pool of participants, we will randomly assign them to different treatments. The first treatment we will test is the impact of providing feedback to households about their performance in reducing energy use relative to other households. In addition to this treatment, we will also test the effect of sending reminders to households to check their relative performance on the utility’s mobile app.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in Python.
Randomization unit
Individual randomization.
Clusters
N/A
Observations
6,000 people
Arms
1500 control group, 1500 for each treatment group
Primary outcomes
The cost effectiveness of performance feedback and energy conservation reminders in reducing carbon and particulate matter emissions.

Cited by

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Keywords