Lucky to Work

How to cite

Bhattacharya, Puja; Mollerstrom, Johanna. 2022. "Lucky to Work." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010591. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10591-2.0

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Puja Bhattacharya* , Johanna Mollerstrom

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010591
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10591-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2020-07-09 – 2024-02-29
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C90, C91, D63, D81, H23
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10591

Abstract

People often regard inequalities as more acceptable when they reflect differences in effort rather than luck. In practice, however, effort and luck are commonly intertwined and elements of luck decide whether there is even an opportunity to exert effort. We study redistributive behavior when it is common knowledge that luck completely determines whether an agent gets to work. Using survey experiments in general population samples in the United States and Sweden, we document how spectators tasked with redistributing income between agents largely ignore the fact that work status is exogenous, and grant working agents both more earnings and more utility than non-workers. One reason that this pattern arises seems to be that initial, pre-redistribution earnings act as a stronger reference point when agents work, even when their ability to work is randomly determined. Spectators behave very similarly in the United States and in Sweden.

Experimental design

We conduct an experiment to identify individuals’ redistributive preferences in situations where luck completely determines whether a person can work or not. The experiment includes two types of participants: agents and spectators. Our main focus is on the decisions of impartial spectators who choose to redistribute income between two agents receiving unequal initial earnings.
The agents all start by trying out an Encoding Task for one minute in Part 1 of the experiment. After that, in Part 2, the agents are paired and one in each pair is assigned a high earning of $1.20 (agent H) and the other is assigned low earnings $0.20 (agent L). The agents are given one of two assignments at random: work (do the encoding task again for another minute) or not work (wait for one minute). Each spectator is matched with a pair of agents, observes their roles and assignments and decides if, and how much, to redistribute from H to L.
Our main treatment (Treatment 1) will allow us to document redistribution decisions in situations where who can and who cannot work is assigned at random. In Treatment 1, spectators make redistribution decisions between pairs of agents one of who works and the other waits. The ‘worker’ receives the high initial earnings ($H) while the ‘non-worker’ receives the low initial earnings ($L). Agents are told, another participant who has not taken part in the survey will learn of their roles and work status and determine their final payment.
To benchmark how spectators in Treatment 1 tradeoff initial luck with subsequent work status, we compare the results of Treatment 1 with two benchmark treatments - Treatment 2 and Treatment 3. In Treatment 2 both agents wait while in Treatment 3, both agents work. Hence, in the benchmark treatments, initial earnings is still assigned at random (as in Treatment 1), but now both agents have the same work status. If spectators in Treatment 1 condition decisions solely on the fact that work status was exogenously assigned (without regard to the difference in work status between agents), then redistribution decisions across treatments 1, 2 and 3 would look similar. Alternately, if spectators base their decision on different work status (albeit assigned at random), we expect to observe lower redistribution in treatment 1 as compared to treatments 2 and 3.
Participants are recruited in the US and Sweden and the surveys are administered by the market research firm Respondi.

***** MAJOR UPDATE *****
As part of the revision process, two treatment variations (of our original experiment) will be conducted with participants recruited through Prolific. The treatments will vary from the original experiment on two dimensions - a) the stakes offered to agents to complete Part 2 of their survey, and b) the piece-rate payment offered to all participants (agents and spectators) for every letter encoded in Part 1 in the Encoding Task.

The new sessions will also re-run old Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 using Prolific participants as a robustness check and to benchmark the results of the new treatments. Below we list the 3 (2 new and 1 old) versions of the experiment that will be conducted -
1. Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 (Low Wage-Low Stake) : These two treatments are identical to Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 in our original experiment. It offers a piece-rate wage of $0.12 per letter encoded in Part 1. It additionally assigns Participant H with $1.40 and
Participant L with $0.20 as in the original experiment.

2. Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 (Low Wage-High Stake) : These two treatments differ from Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 in our original experiment on one account - it assigns Participant H with $7 and Participant L with $1. Hence, the spectators allocation options are ($7,$1) ; ($6.50, $1.50); ($6,$2) ; ($5.50, $2.50); ($5,$3) ; ($4.50, 3.50); ($4,$4) where the first term inside each bracket denotes the amount allocated to Participant H and the second term denotes the amount allocated to Participant L.

3. Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 (High Wage-High Stake) : These two treatments differ from Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 in our original experiment on two accounts.
First, it assigns Participant H with $7 and Participant L with $1. Hence, the spectators allocation options are ($7,$1) ; ($6.50, $1.50); ($6,$2) ; ($5.50, $2.50); ($5,$3) ; ($4.50, 3.50); ($4,$4) where the first term inside each bracket denotes the amount allocated to Participant H and the second term denotes the amount allocated to Participant L.
Second, the piece-rate wage for encoding in Part 1 is increases from $0.12 per letter to $0.60 per letter.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization through Qualtrics program
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
1000 subjects in the United States and 1000 subjects in Sweden **** Major Update **** New sessions - 6 total treatments - 100 in each treatment arm.
Observations
1000 subjects in the United States and 1000 subjects in Sweden (same as the cluster) **** Major Update **** New sessions - 6 total treatments - 100 in each treatment arm.
Arms
250 individuals in each treatment arm for each country **** Major Update **** New sessions - 6 total treatments - 100 in each treatment arm.
Primary outcomes
Final Income Allocation by Subjects in the role of spectators.

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Keywords