Unarmed Peace and the Paradox of Power
How to cite
Rittmannsberger, Thomas; Baier, Alexandra; Seelos, Sophia. 2023. "Unarmed Peace and the Paradox of Power." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010588. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10588-1.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Armed conflicts and wars do not only lead to extraordinary humanitarian suffering but also cause tremendous economic losses. In recent years, the economic literature has set out to investigates trade-offs between investment either in conflict technology or in welfare enhancing production, using the guns-versus-butter model. This model presents a framework where conflicting agents are able to appropriate the endogenously produced welfare of the opponent. As in other conflict models, social losses arise due to investments into conflict technology (e.g. arming). This study aims to experimentally test conditions under which (unarmed) peace can emerge in a guns-versus-butter setting. The design is based on the theoretical framework of Garfinkel & Syropoulos (2021), which introduces interesting extensions to the standard guns-versus-butter setting and allows distinguishing between arming and conflict initiation decisions. Building on this theory, we conduct two treatments to examine whether unequal resource-distributions between conflicting parties influence arming and conflict-initiation decisions. The main objective of this study is to experimentally test conditions under which peace can be sustained and welfare losses be reduced.
Our results will provide important insights to researchers and policy makers into conditions that have to be met in order to avoid conflicts and attain peace.
Intervention
We experimentally investigate conditions under which peace can be sustained using a student sample. In particular, we are interested whether (unarmed) peace can be sustained if (armed) conflicts are destructive. Furthermore, we study if unequal resource distributions disrupt peace and lead parties to engage in conflicts.
The experimental conditions differ in the distribution of resources between conflicting parties:
Condition 1: EQUAL: R1 = 100 Tokens; R2 = 100 Tokens
Condition 2: UNEQUAL: R1 = 80Tokens; R2 = 120Tokens
Our design allows us to experimentally investigate the effect of inequality on the emergence and stability of (unarmed) peace
Experimental design
The experiment will be conducted at the EconLab at the University of Innsbruck. Building on the model by Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2021), we employ an experiment with students in the role of conflicting parties who play the game for 7 rounds. Since we are interested in a one-period setting, we randomly re-match parties after each period, ensuring that the same pair of players will only meet once, therefore impeding reputation-building between players.
We will conduct two experimental conditions. We will run 2 sessions with 24 participants, grouped into clusters of 8 in EQUAL, and three sessions with 14 participants in UNEQUAL, grouped into one cluster.
References:
Garfinkel, M. R. & Syropoulos, C. (2021). Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo. Games and Economic Behavior, 130, 148–178.
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.