Social Norm and Debt Repayment: Field Experiments in a Debt-collector Enterprise
How to cite
Saulitis, Andris. 2016. "Social Norm and Debt Repayment: Field Experiments in a Debt-collector Enterprise." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001043. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1043-2.1
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
The study will consist of two field experiments in cooperation with Latvian debt-collector enterprise. The research will examine the extent to which a descriptive social norm and a personalization motivate consumers to pay back their debts rather than to give up and default. Both the effectiveness of communication and the content will be examined. It will provide information on the strenght of social norms regarding the financial discipline among the households in Latvia.
Intervention
During the experiments debtors will be randomized among either to a control group, which will not receive any messages, or a treatment group to receive weekly assigned mobile text messages and/or e-mails. The research will examine separately and in combination four kinds of treatments and their effect on compliance: (1) a simple reminder; (2) a descriptive social norm; (3) personalization in terms of the sender/debt-collector; (4) personalization in terms of the debtor.
Experimental design
The study includes two field experiments in Latvia in cooperation with the debt-collector. In both of them, treatment groups will receive e-mails and/or mobile text messages. The differences are in terms of type of the debtors in the samples. In Experiment 1 invidividuals are in a status of a default, but in Experiment 2 the consumers have started to repay their debt. The debtors will receive the treatment through both communication channels (e-mails and text messages). In case the information on debtor will contain only one out of two communication channels, the debtor will be contacted via the only available channel.
Design details
Papers from this trial
- Saulı̄tis, A. (2023). Nudging debtors with non-performing loans: Evidence from three field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 37, 100776. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100776 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100776
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