Social Norm and Debt Repayment: Field Experiments in a Debt-collector Enterprise

How to cite

Saulitis, Andris. 2016. "Social Norm and Debt Repayment: Field Experiments in a Debt-collector Enterprise." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001043. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1043-2.1

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Andris Saulitis*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001043
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1043-2.1
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2016-02-08 – 2016-04-04
Countries
Latvia ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1043

Abstract

The study will consist of two field experiments in cooperation with Latvian debt-collector enterprise. The research will examine the extent to which a descriptive social norm and a personalization motivate consumers to pay back their debts rather than to give up and default. Both the effectiveness of communication and the content will be examined. It will provide information on the strenght of social norms regarding the financial discipline among the households in Latvia.

Intervention

During the experiments debtors will be randomized among either to a control group, which will not receive any messages, or a treatment group to receive weekly assigned mobile text messages and/or e-mails. The research will examine separately and in combination four kinds of treatments and their effect on compliance: (1) a simple reminder; (2) a descriptive social norm; (3) personalization in terms of the sender/debt-collector; (4) personalization in terms of the debtor.

Experimental design

The study includes two field experiments in Latvia in cooperation with the debt-collector. In both of them, treatment groups will receive e-mails and/or mobile text messages. The differences are in terms of type of the debtors in the samples. In Experiment 1 invidividuals are in a status of a default, but in Experiment 2 the consumers have started to repay their debt. The debtors will receive the treatment through both communication channels (e-mails and text messages). In case the information on debtor will contain only one out of two communication channels, the debtor will be contacted via the only available channel.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization will be done in office by a computer.
Randomization unit
Cases from the debt-collectors portfolio.
Clusters
Experiment 1: 27,209 cases Experiment 2: 2,845 cases
Observations
27,209+2,845=30,054
Arms
Experiment 1: Control group 5,441, treatment group at least 2,720 Experiment 2: Control group 569, treatment group at least 284
Primary outcomes
The outcome variable in the experiments is the level of debtor’s deviance. In Experiment 1, it includes three possible outcomes: (1) debtor does not respond; (2) debtor communicates; (3) debtor has agreed upon the repayment plan. At the beginning of Experiment 1, the debtors were either in the (1) or (2) group. In Experiment 2, the deviance level will be measured as a continuous variable, measuring the number of days, which the debtor deviated from the repayment plan. The variable ranges from “0”, which means that the payment was made on time, to “35”, when the debtor’s repayment plan is cancelled by the debt-collector. In order to monitor the results during the experiments, every Monday the debt-collector company will report on the status of each case. These status codes will provide the information on the performance of the level of deviance in each of the groups

Papers from this trial

  1. Saulı̄tis, A. (2023). Nudging debtors with non-performing loans: Evidence from three field experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 37, 100776. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100776 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100776

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords