The Moral Economy of Supervisor Kickbacks and Its Significance for Corruption

How to cite

sierra, Raul sanchez de la; Titeca, Kristof; Xie, Haoyang; Nkuku, Albert Malukisa; Lameke, Aimable Amani. 2022. "The Moral Economy of Supervisor Kickbacks and Its Significance for Corruption." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010419. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10419-1.0

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Raul sanchez de la sierra* , Kristof Titeca , Haoyang Xie , Albert Malukisa Nkuku , Aimable Amani Lameke

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010419
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10419-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2015-06-19 – 2015-07-20
Countries
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) (Kinshasa)
JEL codes
D23, O1, D73
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10419

Abstract

Covert payments from state officials to their super visors (supervisor kickbacks) are a frequently overlooked phenomenon, yet they can reveal fundamental features of collusion between officials and their supervisors. Supervisor kickbacks are particularly important in Sub-Saharan African societies, where a “moral economy” of corruption with re-distributive norms has been documented. We conduct a randomized unconditional cash transfer on traffic police agents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to characterize the ways in which state officers' income is paid in kickbacks to their supervisors, and the role of income distribution on the kickbacks.

Intervention

Intervention: The top-up was a cash transfer given to police agents on some days. The cash transfer was unconditional, thus involved no quid-pro-quo, and hence did not amount to a bribe. The average top-up given to each agent amounted to 17.62 in a day. For each agent, the value of the top-up received on a given day was calculated in which they received a top-up was calculated to be equal to their total daily income. To calculate this amount, we estimated the number of bribes that each team of agents received, on average, daily, in preparatory work, and added those to their official wages. Each team was selected an equal number of days to receive the top-up. What days they received it was random.

We embedded two additional sub-treatments:

Sub-treatment 1: We also randomized whether the project staff informed the supervisor of a specific top-up taking place on a given day for a team. In one treatment arm, we did not disclose the specific day and time of the top-up to the supervisor. This was consistent with our agreement with the supervisors, who allowed for occasional transfers to their agents. In another arm, we notified the supervisor in the morning and prior to the top-up to a given team that day, that the team had been selected for a top-up on that day.

Sub-treatment 2: the level of the top-up; we assigned high and low values of the top-up in randomly selected teams x days

Experimental design

Main Intervention: Each team of agents was entitled to receive the top-up on half of the study days. We randomly assigned, within each team strata, an equal number of days for all team members to receive the top-up. Thus, the randomization clusters are 337 team x days.

Sub-treatment 1: Supervisor notified. Amongst the team-days that had been randomly selected for a top-up, we randomly selected team-days to the supervisor notified vs supervisor not notified treatments, stratifying by team of agents.

Sub-treatment 2: We randomly assigned high top-up vs. low top-up, among the team-days that were assigned to receive a top-up. Separately for each team, and among the days they were selected to receive the top-up, we randomly assigned days to high top-up vs. low top-up within supervisor notified and not notified treatment status. This generates three randomly assigned levels: zero, .5, and 1.5.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done in office by a computer. Implementers were not informed of the random assignment until each day at 6am when they had to deliver cash, to prevent them from using that information in ways that could undermine statistical credibility.
Randomization unit
Cluster: Team of police agents in the street X day
Clusters
375 Team of police agents in the street X day clusters
Observations
Approximately 1,575 police agents in the street X day observations.
Arms
Control: 186 Top-up: 186, of which: Sub-treatment 1 (supervisor notified): control (93), treatment (93) Sub-treatment 2 (top-up level): low (63), high (63), not included in top-up level randomization (60)
Primary outcomes
We focus on the monetary kickbacks from the top-up on a given day. To measure this, an auditor asked the agents at the end of each day to describe how they allocated the top-up. Since each team may have received a different top-up and may have shared a different amount, the auditor conducted private conversations with each team every evening.
Secondary outcomes
We also measure the behavior of the agents. Notably, we collect proxies of effort on the official prerogatives of the traffic police agency (absenteeism, traffic jams, accidents, detentions and escorts to the police station) and on the unofficial prerogatives (bribe taking and driver harassment)
Sponsors
Name: International Growth Center Location: London Url: https://www.theigc.org/ Name: Private Enterprise in Developing and Low-Income Countries Location: Londo Url: https://pedl.cepr.org/

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Keywords