Competition and Bribery in Auction Experiments

How to cite

McKay, Thomas. 2022. "Competition and Bribery in Auction Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010402. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10402-1.0

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Thomas McKay*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010402
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10402-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-11-14 – 2022-12-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C92, D44, D73
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10402

Abstract

Does competition affect the impact of bribery on auction allocation and revenue? Bribery auctions are a collection of auction models where the auctioneer extracts a share of the seller revenue by soliciting bribes from potential bidders. This study aims to experimentally test this effect of competition in reducing the ineffeciency of bribery. To do this I introduce a two stage auction game. In the first stage the players can bid for the right of first refusal (ROFR) followed by an entry decision. Stage two is a standard first price auction (FPA) auction for the good with ROFR assigned to the winner of the first stage. I then vary the degree of competition in the first stage. This model is designed with experimental testing in mind, and thus has unique symmetric equilibria for any level of competition.

Intervention

This study is economics lab experiment testing a multistage bribery auction game when varying the degree of competition in bribery.

Experimental design

This is a 3x1 study with between subjects design. Each game consists of 3 subjects who participate as bidders, while the seller and auctioneer are automated. The difference between treatments is the number of players competing in the first stage (3, 2 or 1). In addition, when there would be only a single subject in the bribery auction, I randomly assign ROFR to a random subject, as having a single bidder in an auction complicates the implementation and may be confusing for subjects. My design thus has three treatments. In treatment PC all subjects compete in the bribery stage. In treatment IC, 2 of the 3 subjects are randomly selected to participate in the bribery stage. In treatment NC, there is no bribery stage and instead the ROFR is assigned to a random subject.

Design details

Randomization method
Random assignment to treatment, and blocked lab design in groups of 6 with random rematching within blocks.
Randomization unit
Block of 6 subjects.
Clusters
30 Blocks
Observations
180 participants, 1200 Auction games.
Arms
10 blocks per treatment, 30 blocks total
Primary outcomes
The level of entry in each treatment.
Secondary outcomes
Efficiency, Bribery Auction Price, Goods Auction Price

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords