Competition and Bribery in Auction Experiments
How to cite
McKay, Thomas. 2022. "Competition and Bribery in Auction Experiments." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010402. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10402-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Does competition affect the impact of bribery on auction allocation and revenue? Bribery auctions are a collection of auction models where the auctioneer extracts a share of the seller revenue by soliciting bribes from potential bidders. This study aims to experimentally test this effect of competition in reducing the ineffeciency of bribery. To do this I introduce a two stage auction game. In the first stage the players can bid for the right of first refusal (ROFR) followed by an entry decision. Stage two is a standard first price auction (FPA) auction for the good with ROFR assigned to the winner of the first stage. I then vary the degree of competition in the first stage. This model is designed with experimental testing in mind, and thus has unique symmetric equilibria for any level of competition.
Intervention
This study is economics lab experiment testing a multistage bribery auction game when varying the degree of competition in bribery.
Experimental design
This is a 3x1 study with between subjects design. Each game consists of 3 subjects who participate as bidders, while the seller and auctioneer are automated. The difference between treatments is the number of players competing in the first stage (3, 2 or 1). In addition, when there would be only a single subject in the bribery auction, I randomly assign ROFR to a random subject, as having a single bidder in an auction complicates the implementation and may be confusing for subjects. My design thus has three treatments. In treatment PC all subjects compete in the bribery stage. In treatment IC, 2 of the 3 subjects are randomly selected to participate in the bribery stage. In treatment NC, there is no bribery stage and instead the ROFR is assigned to a random subject.
Design details
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