How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education

How to cite

Blattman, Christopher; Blair, Robert A.; Hartman, Alexandra C.. 2016. "How to Promote Order and Property Rights under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior through Community Education." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001038. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1038-1.0

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Christopher Blattman* , Robert A. Blair , Alexandra C. Hartman

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001038
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1038-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2009-03-01 – 2011-01-31
Countries
Liberia (West Africa)
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1038

Abstract

Dispute resolution institutions facilitate agreements and preserve the peace whenever property rights are imperfect. In weak states, strengthening formal institutions can take decades, and so state and aid interventions also try to shape informal practices and norms governing disputes. Their goal is to improve bargaining and commitment, thus limiting disputes and violence. Mass education campaigns that promote alternative dispute resolution (ADR) are common examples of these interventions. We studied the short-term impacts of one such campaign in Liberia, where property disputes are endemic. Residents of 86 of 246 towns randomly received training in ADR practices and norms; this training reached 15% of adults. One year later, treated towns had higher resolution of land disputes and lower violence. Impacts spilled over to untrained residents. We also saw unintended consequences: more extrajudicial punishment and (weakly) more nonviolent disagreements. Results imply that mass education can change high-stakes behaviors, and improving informal bargaining and enforcement behavior can promote order in weak states.

Intervention

This study looks at the effectiveness of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) education as a peacebuilding tool. ADR is a set of informal practices and norms of negotiation and mediation that are intended to help parties reach self-enforcing bargains faster than courts can. The study was conducted in Liberia where rule of law is weak and property disputes are endemic and often escalate to violence. A total of 86 communities were given 8 days of ADR education and subsequent dispute outcomes within those communities were surveyed within the next few months.

Experimental design

The government of Liberia nominated 246 communities in the counties of Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh for ADR education. Out of these communities 116 were randomly chosen for treatment, the ADR education workshop, to be rolled out in five phases. Treatment communities were randomly assigned to the phases. Due to resource constraints, the training was completed in 86 communities instead of 116 leaving 160 as control.
In each treatment community, 15% of the adult population participated in the training which was conducted over 8 days by two facilitators over a period of two months. Groups of 35 participants were educated in each workshop. However, 16 of the 86 communities were subject to intense treatment whereby 25% of the population participated in the training to understand the marginal effect of increased training. The selection of these populations was not random rather were by choice of village leaders.
Endline surveys begun approximately ten months after the first workshop and were conducted on a rolling basis even as treatment workshops were being rolled in many communities. Thus in some communities the endline survey was concurrent with treatment. Although this was unintentional, this allowed the researchers to understand the impact of the ADR education program over a timeline of zero months to almost two years.

Design details

Randomization method
randomization done in office by a computer
Randomization unit
Communities. Of the 246 communities nominated by the government 116 were chosen by stratified randomization of communities. Individuals households not randomized.
Clusters
246 communities
Observations
Community size ranges from 100-5,000 individuals and four interviews per community thus planned observations = 4,000 - 20,000 individuals
Arms
130 control communities, 116 treatment communities
Primary outcomes
Outcome variables measure impact on: (i) land disputes (ii) women and minorities (iii) property ownership and security (iv) interpersonal disputes (v) community level disputes (vi) Whether difficult conflicts are resolved

Materials

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Keywords