Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso
How to cite
Lierl, Malte; Holmlund, Marcus. 2022. "Third-Party Performance Pay to Improve Local Government Accountability: A Field Experiment in Burkina Faso." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010357. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10357-1.2
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Can local government accountability be improved by giving community-based organizations a financial stake in their local government's performance? In a field experiment in Burkina Faso, we test a "third-party performance pay" scheme for community-based organizations (CBOs). Selected CBOs are promised a variable cash grant that is proportional to changes in their local government's performance scores over a two-year period. We test if third-party performance pay (1) motivates CBOs to actively lobby for better municipal performance, (2) increases accountability and problem-awareness of municipal decision makers and (3) ultimately leads to improvements in municipal government performance. We also investigate if the incentive scheme had any unintended consequences for the internal functioning of the beneficiary CBOs.
Intervention
We test a third-party performancy pay (3PPP) scheme that aims to incentivize existing, well-functioning local collective action groups (community-based organizations or CBOs) to hold local governments accountable for their performance. The CBOs are given a direct financial stake in the performance of their local government, by promising them an unconditional cash grant that is proportional to improvements in their municipal government's performance indicators over a two-year period, as measured independently through Burkina Faso's annual municipal performance monitoring survey (SUPERMUN).
Under the 3PPP scheme, the partner CBOs can potentially increase their payoff by nudging their local government to improve its performance. However, since the cash grants are not conditional on any specific actions the CBOs undertake -- even if the CBO does nothing at all, it remains eligible to receive the cash grant -- it incentivizes only those actions the CBO believes to be worth their time and promising enough to have an actual impact on municipal government performance.
Experimental design
See the research design description in the blind analysis report.
Design details
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