Common Ownership and Firm Strategic Behaviour – Endogenous Ownership & Strategic Uncertainty

How to cite

Frey, Jonas. 2022. "Common Ownership and Firm Strategic Behaviour – Endogenous Ownership & Strategic Uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010354. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10354-1.0

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Jonas Frey*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010354
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10354-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-11-06 – 2022-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
L13, L14, L41, J33, G32, D21
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10354

Abstract

We study the production decisions of managers in an experimental Cournot market as a function of the ownership structure of the experimental firms. This trial is related to previous trials (AEARCTR-0006817, AEARCTR-0008810 & AEARCTR-0010265).

In our experiment, there are two firms, managed by two managers and owned by two shareholders. Managers choose production quantities. The price in the market depends on the total production of both firms. Subjects play the experiment for multiple rounds.
Shareholders initially own 100% of one of the firms each (divided ownership). During the experiment, they have the option to exchange half of their shares so that they each own 50% of both firms. The shareholders incentives change with the ownership. If they each own shares in only one firm, they are best off when their manager produces the Cournot duopoly quantity. If they each own shares in both firms, they are best of when their manager produces halve of the monopoly quantity. Overall shareholder profits are higher if both managers produce half of the monopoly quantity than if both produce the Cournot duopoly quantity.

One of the questions we studied in Trial AEARCTR-0008810, was whether shareholders choose to diversify in order to bring themselves into a position where they can benefit from setting anticompetitive incentives. We found that this rarely happens. One potential explanation is the strategic uncertainty created by the fact that managers may not respond to incentives as expected. In this trial we explore this hypothesis by replacing human managers with computer controlled managers who always make the optimal choice given their incentives.

Intervention

This trial consists of only one treatment, which we will compare to results from the other trials listed in the description of this trial. The intervention is to replace human managers with computer-controlled managers who always maximise their profit, given their incentives. This treatment is an extension of the treatments run as part of AEARCTR-0008810. We will use data from this previous trial as control group.

Experimental design

In our experiment, there are two firms, managed by two managers and owned by two shareholders. Managers choose production quantities. The price in the market depends on the total production of both firms. Subjects play the experiment for multiple rounds.
Shareholders initially own 100% of one of the firms each (divided ownership). During the experiment, they have the option to exchange half of their shares so that they each own 50% of both firms. The shareholders incentives change with the ownership. If they each own shares in only one firm, they are best off when their manager produces the Cournot duopoly quantity. If they each own shares in both firms, they are best of when their manager produces halve of the monopoly quantity. Overall shareholder profits are higher if both managers produce half of the monopoly quantity than if both produce the Cournot duopoly quantity.

Design details

Randomization method
Since this trial extends 2 existing treatments run as part of AEARCTR-0008810. The randomisation comes from the time at which participants are recruited into the trial. Subejcts recruietet in the first wave done es part of AEARCTR-0008810 are the control and subjects recruited in the second wave which we plan to recruit now are the treatment.
Randomization unit
The randomisation unit is the experimental session as we will compare sessions from this trial to sessions from previous trials.
Clusters
4 sessions of 50 people each
Observations
200 New observations in addition to the 400 existing observations collected as part of AEARCTR-0008810.
Arms
200
Primary outcomes
The primary outcome is the choice of sharehodlers to swap shares in roder to become diversified.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords