Common Ownership and Firm Strategic Behaviour – Endogenous Ownership & Strategic Uncertainty
How to cite
Frey, Jonas. 2022. "Common Ownership and Firm Strategic Behaviour – Endogenous Ownership & Strategic Uncertainty." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010354. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10354-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We study the production decisions of managers in an experimental Cournot market as a function of the ownership structure of the experimental firms. This trial is related to previous trials (AEARCTR-0006817, AEARCTR-0008810 & AEARCTR-0010265).
In our experiment, there are two firms, managed by two managers and owned by two shareholders. Managers choose production quantities. The price in the market depends on the total production of both firms. Subjects play the experiment for multiple rounds.
Shareholders initially own 100% of one of the firms each (divided ownership). During the experiment, they have the option to exchange half of their shares so that they each own 50% of both firms. The shareholders incentives change with the ownership. If they each own shares in only one firm, they are best off when their manager produces the Cournot duopoly quantity. If they each own shares in both firms, they are best of when their manager produces halve of the monopoly quantity. Overall shareholder profits are higher if both managers produce half of the monopoly quantity than if both produce the Cournot duopoly quantity.
One of the questions we studied in Trial AEARCTR-0008810, was whether shareholders choose to diversify in order to bring themselves into a position where they can benefit from setting anticompetitive incentives. We found that this rarely happens. One potential explanation is the strategic uncertainty created by the fact that managers may not respond to incentives as expected. In this trial we explore this hypothesis by replacing human managers with computer controlled managers who always make the optimal choice given their incentives.
Intervention
This trial consists of only one treatment, which we will compare to results from the other trials listed in the description of this trial. The intervention is to replace human managers with computer-controlled managers who always maximise their profit, given their incentives. This treatment is an extension of the treatments run as part of AEARCTR-0008810. We will use data from this previous trial as control group.
Experimental design
In our experiment, there are two firms, managed by two managers and owned by two shareholders. Managers choose production quantities. The price in the market depends on the total production of both firms. Subjects play the experiment for multiple rounds.
Shareholders initially own 100% of one of the firms each (divided ownership). During the experiment, they have the option to exchange half of their shares so that they each own 50% of both firms. The shareholders incentives change with the ownership. If they each own shares in only one firm, they are best off when their manager produces the Cournot duopoly quantity. If they each own shares in both firms, they are best of when their manager produces halve of the monopoly quantity. Overall shareholder profits are higher if both managers produce half of the monopoly quantity than if both produce the Cournot duopoly quantity.
Design details
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