How School Matching Designs Affect Inequality: Experimental Evidence

How to cite

Herzog, Sabrina; Hermes, Henning. 2022. "How School Matching Designs Affect Inequality: Experimental Evidence." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010302. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10302-2.0

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Sabrina Herzog* , Henning Hermes

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010302
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10302-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-01-01 – 2023-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
D02, D47, D81, D91, I24
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10302

Abstract

Education has long-lasting effects in life outcomes of individuals. For some time now, market designers investigate matching mechanisms for school allocation, aiming to enhance fairness and ensure equal opportunities for children. Widely discussed are the Immediate-Acceptance (IA) and the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) mechanism, where the latter one has been agreed upon as more desirable due to its strategy-proofness which makes truthful preference submission a dominant strategy.
However, lab and field investigations have revealed that often applicants do not understand the strategy-proofness of the mechanism. This becomes especially problematic if applicants differ in submission strategies correlating with their socio-economic status (SES). The intended fairness might actually end up in an even higher socio-economic gap in educational outcomes.
In an online experiment, parents matched in groups of 16 with induced preferences over 4 schools have to choose a school ranking. After explaining them either the IA or DA mechanism we ask them to submit an application form for a school choice problem in which they compete over the 16 seats at the 4 schools. We pre-select parents by SES. In an additional treatment variation, we examine whether advice on the submission strategy (‘skip-the-middle school’ in IA and ‘submit the true preference order’ in DA) affects the socio-economic gap in school admissions. To gain a deeper understanding of what drives parents’ choices, we additionally elicit survey measures including, e.g., cognitive ability, beliefs about other parents’ behavior and returns to school quality, or trust in institutions.

Experimental design

We employ a between-subject design with four treatments. In each treatment group we sort parents of low and high socio-economic status (SES) in equal proportions.

Design details

Randomization method
computerized random assignment
Randomization unit
socio-econcomic status, individual
Clusters
see "Sample size"
Observations
960 parents in three treatments
Arms
240 in Deferred-Acceptance without advice; 240 in Deferred-Acceptance with advice; 240 in Immediate-Acceptance without advice; 240 in Immediate-Acceptance with advice (always 120/240 low-SES parents and 120/240 high-SES parents)
Primary outcomes
Truth-telling rates, skip-the-middle rates

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords