Exposure to taxes and redistribution

How to cite

Seres, Gyula; Lim, Noah. 2022. "Exposure to taxes and redistribution." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010286. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10286-1.0

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Gyula Seres* , Noah Lim

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010286
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10286-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-10-31 – 2022-12-15
Countries
Private
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10286

Abstract

This proposal aims at testing for bias in redistribution preferences. Using a laboratory labor market experiment, we can test whether preferences are influenced by experience with taxes and redistribution. The support for taxes is low and decreasing worldwide. Moreover, the top tax rates dropped substantially since the 80s, signaling a reference for a lower redistribution rate. This contradicts survey experiments that either show indifference toward income inequality or that rising inequality increases the claimed support for redistribution. Using an incentive-compatible voting mechanism on the level of taxes and redistribution, we use a laboratory experiment can identify the effect of changes in an individual's role (net payer or receiver) on their preferences about redistribution.

Intervention

In the laboratory experiment, randomly matched groups of three subjects play a repeated real-effort game with a flat-rate payment $0.30 for successfully completed tasks. A round lasts for 4 minutes. The real-effort task is to type a randomly generated block of 20 characters backward into a text box. The blocks of characters were randomly drawn with replacements from a pool of 500 pre-generated blocks. After submitting the text, participants receive feedback and a new block of characters.

In each round, a share t% of their payment may be taxed and redistributed evenly within the group. There are 5 periods. After every period, all payoffs, taxes, and subsidies are disclosed to the group members. In period 1, there is no tax. In period 2, the tax rate depends on the treatment. In the high redistribution (HR) treatment, t=50%. In the low redistribution (LR) treatment, t=10%. In the voting (VR) treatment, the subjects cast a vote on their preferred rate from the interval [0,60], and the median vote is implemented. From 3, there is always a vote before the work stage.

Experimental design

In the laboratory experiment, randomly matched groups of three subjects play a repeated real-effort game with a flat-rate payment $0.30 for successfully completed tasks. A round lasts for 4 minutes. The real-effort task is to type a randomly generated block of 20 characters backward into a text box. The blocks of characters were randomly drawn with replacements from a pool of 500 pre-generated blocks. After submitting the text, participants receive feedback and a new block of characters. There are 5 rounds. After each round, the subjects pay a tax which is equally redistributed within the group.

Design details

Randomization method
Group membership is randomized by computer.
Randomization unit
Treatment is randomized at the session level.
Clusters
100 subjects in each of the 3 treatments.
Observations
300 participants
Arms
100
Primary outcomes
Tax preferences; score in the real-effort task

Cited by

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Keywords