Individual vs Strategic Decision-Making: A Key to Work Performance

How to cite

Shan, You; Liu, Tracy Xiao; Wang, Shu; Zhong, Songfa. 2023. "Individual vs Strategic Decision-Making: A Key to Work Performance." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010284. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10284-1.0

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You Shan* , Tracy Xiao Liu , Shu Wang , Songfa Zhong

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010284
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10284-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-11-09 – 2022-11-16
Countries
China ()
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10284

Abstract

We always make decisions, sometimes on individuals, like shopping, allocating time to different task, etc., and sometimes strategically, like promoting goods to customers, playing tennis, etc. Theoretically, we often assume that people do maximization in these decisions. These assumptions of rationalities are prominent in economics. However, empirically, the quality of these decisions is mixed and depends on the ability whether people do their maximization. We believe that most people are not rational, do non-optimal behavior, i.e., not maximizing their utilities. However, little is known when we look at them in a general decision-making mechanism including these two kinds of irrationality. How common and how heterogeneous is it for people to exhibit multiple irrationality? How are rationalities correlated and interact within-people and how distinct are they? What do they imply or affect field behaviors in real lives?

We address such questions with evidence, from a large national real estate brokerage firm, on the brokers' experimental data from multiple task on rationality and their field behaviors of multiple real estate brokerage. For each of 10000+ broker agents, we measure a set of decision makings quality. Specifically, we measure GARP consistency in standard convex budget sets of risk preference, violations of choices in an evaluating real estates task as proxy variables for individual decision-making rationality. We measure strategic decision-making rationality in 11-20 Game, as proxy variables for strategic decision makings skills. We also measure cognitive skills in Raven's IQ Test, theory of mind ability in Reading the Minds of Eyes, personality traits in Big Five and demographics. Then we try to link these experimental results to their field behaviors, like performance of real estate brokerage transactions.

Intervention

We measure individual decision-making rationality and strategic decision-making rationality. As such, we do not have an experimental intervention. Rather, we rely in natural variation on subject's characteristics.

Experimental design

We design a survey experiment in leading real estate agency platform in China. The experiment consists of four sections. In Section 1, in the risk task, subjects are asked to allocate a budget between two risky assets, each one of which obtains with a probability of 0.5. The assets have different payoffs, so that allocations give an indication of risk preferences. There are 22 questions in this task. In Section 2, in the house task, subjects are presented with 21 trials which are consisted of all pairwise non-repeating combinations of 7 housing options. A subject is asked to select the option with higher list price. In Section 3, subjects play an incentivized competitive game of a variant of Arad and Rubinstein (2012)’s 11-20 Money Request game. We randomly rematched subjects and gave subjects no feedback about their performance during the course of the experiment. The subjects face 5 rounds of 11-20 game of varying incentives. In Section 4, we measure 5 Big personality of subjects, subjects' IQ by Raven Test, CRT scores, and Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test scores.

Design details

Randomization method
Subjects were randomly assigned to different versions of the survey. The difference of survey is the order of questions and order of tasks. This randomization was done by the software used to conduct the survey.
Randomization unit
15000 Subjects
Clusters
15000 Subjects
Observations
15000 Subjects
Arms
15000 Subjects
Primary outcomes
1. Individual decision-making rationality We use revealed preference analysis to check whether subjects’ behavior comply with utility maximization hypothesis. It will be done by checking whether individual behavior is consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) and measuring the extent to which it violates GARP. We use various indices of measuring GARP violations, including Afriat’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI). This will be separately done in domains of decision-making under risk preference, house preference. 2. Strategic decision-making rationality We use level-k model to check subjects’ choices from 11-20 game. The behaviors in 11-20 game reflect the interaction between the ability of steps reasoning and the ability of predicting opponents' behavior. We firstly measure strategic sophistication, depth of reasoning ability, by the average guessing number in rounds of 11-20 game. We secondly measure strategic intelligence, predicting opponents' behavior, by the payoff in rounds of 11-20 game.
Secondary outcomes
Our secondary outcomes include (1) individuals' IQ, (2) individual CRT scores, (3) big five personality traits and (4) Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test scores.

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Keywords