Strategic Interactions with the Assistant of an Algorithm: Information Acquisition Treatment
How to cite
XUE, Lian; Bai, Lu; Gui, Zhengqing; Wei, Lijia. 2022. "Strategic Interactions with the Assistant of an Algorithm: Information Acquisition Treatment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010264. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10264-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
We present a laboratory experiment that examines individuals’ willingness to take advice from algorithms provided by artificial intelligence (AI). We explored two distinguished channels behind the algorithm, the data and the mechanism. In this additional experiment, we will examine individual willingness to pay for the algorithm advice using a within-subject information acquisition treatment design. We will also compare welfare effects, in terms of subject payoff, with regard to information provision and acquisition. The benchmark for comparison where no information is available is borrowed from a previously conducted RCT which we also pre-registered on this website.
Intervention
This is a laboratory experiment, we will randomly invite the student subjects to one of the randomized experimental treatments.
Subjects will be instructed to play a repeated strategic interaction game and will have the opportunity to buy advice from an algorithm.
Subjects' payoff will be determined by the decision they and their counterpart made in the game and the amount they paid for the algorithm.
In the experiment, the maximum amount participants could pay will be lower than the minimum amount they could get from the interaction game.
Experimental design
Our experimental design combines between- and within-subject design.
In the control group, subjects will be instructed to play the one-shot centipede game for a repeated iteration of 10 rounds. Among these, 5 rounds will be played with free algorithm advice and 5 rounds will be played with costly algorithm advice. The order of these 5 rounds will be counterbalanced across sessions.
In the treatment group, subjects will play the same centipede game for 10 rounds with a costly-to-free/free-to-costly counterbalance. The only difference is that in the treatment group, subjects will be informed of the underlying data (including 5 aspects of main determinants) that the algorithm used to generate the predictions.
Design details
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