Social preferences and honesty - an experimental analysis

How to cite

Hole, Astri Drange. 2016. "Social preferences and honesty - an experimental analysis." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001018. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1018-2.0

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Astri Drange Hole*

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0001018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1018-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2016-02-02 – 2016-09-05
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C90; D01; D03; D63
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/1018

Abstract

The project studies if there are any systematic differences in social preferences between managers and people in general. More specifically, the project examines if the sources of income and the cost of redistribution matter for people in the two groups when they make distribution decisions. Given this information, we can study the prevalence of different fairness ideals in the two groups. That is, are people motivated by different moral norms when they decide on important distributive issues?
Additionally, the project measures existence of dishonesty. It aims at mapping any pattern of lying behaviour amongst managers and people in general, and test for any difference in this pattern between the two groups. The project also aims to explore if a high degree of honesty in a group correlates with social preferences in the group.
Next, the project examines if there is a relationship between distributive choices and attitudes towards materialistic values and willingness to compete, respectively. The project also aims to explore if there is a correlation on group level between existence of dishonesty and focus on materialistic values and willingness to compete, respectively.
Finally, if there are differences between the two groups regarding these questions, how can it be explained? Do demographic and/or socio-economic variables make a difference? Are managers – for example – initially more concerned with economic incentives than others, and thus have selected a working carrier accordingly, or have exposure to economic incentives influenced their behaviour over time?

Experimental design

Web based survey experiment with two phases and three treatments.
A toss a coin experiment with priming

Design details

Randomization method
Randomisation by a computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
200 managers and 200 representaitve population
Observations
3600
Arms
400
Primary outcomes
How different sources of income and cost of redistribution affect redistribution behaviour of managers and people in general. Is the difference in dishonest reporting between primed and no primed managers the same as the difference between dishonest reporting in primed an no primed people in general?

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords