Social class, tax evasion and conditional cooperation

How to cite

Francese, Camilo Antonio Cepeda; Vásquez, Raymundo Miguel Campos; Álvarez, Aurora Alejandra Ramírez; Krozer, Alice. 2022. "Social class, tax evasion and conditional cooperation." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010158. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10158-1.0

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Camilo Antonio Cepeda Francese* , Raymundo Miguel Campos Vásquez , Aurora Alejandra Ramírez Álvarez , Alice Krozer

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010158
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10158-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
Completed
Trial dates
2022-10-11 – 2022-10-17
Countries
Mexico (Ciudad de México)
JEL codes
H26, D63, D64
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10158

Abstract

We examine the effect of tax evasion of specific classes on the willingness to pay taxes.

Experimental design

We design an original survey, asking about perceptions about tax rates and evasion by social class, perceptions on equality of opportunities, preferences for redistribution, satisfaction with public services, tax rates and trust on the government. After the main part of the survey, respondents are showed a message informing them about tax evasion of the rich in Mexico. The respondents are then randomized into three groups (baseline, T1 and T2). Each group, except for the baseline, is presented with a hypothetical scenario and asked about the tax rate they would be willing to pay.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by a computer.
Randomization unit
Individuals.
Clusters
1500 individuals
Observations
1500 individuals
Arms
500 Baseline, 500 T1, 500 T2
Primary outcomes
Willingness to pay taxes (2) Perceived tax rate paid by rich households, measured as the number of pesos paid in taxes for every 100 in income. (3) Perception of tax evasion of rich households, measured as the number of pesos evaded for every 100 in tax responsibilities.
Secondary outcomes
(1) Perceived tax rate paid by rich households, measured as the number of pesos paid in taxes for every 100 in income. (2) Perception of tax evasion of rich households, measured as the number of pesos evaded for every 100 in tax responsibilities.

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords