Promoting Early Grade Reading & Numeracy in Tanzania: KiuFunza II
How to cite
Muralidharan, Karthik; Romero, Mauricio; Mbiti, Isaac. 2016. "Promoting Early Grade Reading & Numeracy in Tanzania: KiuFunza II." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0001009. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.1009-1.0
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* Primary investigator
Abstract
Overall student learning levels remain low across East Africa, despite a decade plus of major reforms and significant new investments in public education. In recent years, teacher performance pay has received an increasing amount attention as a means of improving student learning. Yet the current evidence on teacher performance pay is at best mixed, with some studies finding large positive effects, and others finding little or no effects at all. However, these studies are not directly comparable as they are performed in different contexts, with different incentive structures, and different budgets.
In the KiuFunza II RCT we evaluate two different teacher incentive programs implemented in 180 randomly selected government primary schools across ten districts in Tanzania, focusing on English, Kiswahili, and Math in Grades 1, 2, and 3. In the first arm, “levels”, teachers are paid a bonus based on the number of skills within a given subject a student is able to master. In the second arm, “gains”, students are placed in ability groups at the beginning of the year based on starting test scores. Teachers are then rewarded for their students’ improvements within their specific ability groups, regardless of initial learning levels.
The goal of the RCT is to determine whether there is clear evidence that teacher incentive schemes and pay for performance programs are effective at improving learning outcomes.
Intervention
Levels: In the levels-based cash-on-delivery (COD) program, teachers are paid a bonus based on the number of skills their students are able to master within subject tests. That is, even if a student is unable to pass the entire Math test, if they are able to demonstrate mastery of addition and subtraction (but still fail multiplication), the teacher will earn a small bonus.
Whereas under more simplistic COD programs a teacher only receives payment if and only if their student mastered all skills within each subject test to pass the test, the levels incentive payment has now been disaggregated to reward teachers whose students will probably never pass the full tests, but can still improve learning. We are, in short, incentivizing teachers to begin teaching low ability children and not just those who are at the margin of passing the complete tests.
6 schools in each of the 10 districts have been randomly assigned to the levels treatment group.
Gains: While also a program designed to incentivize teacher performance through bonus payments, the gains intervention is designed differently from the levels program described above. Schools receiving this intervention will have their teachers compete in a national tournament for a total “prize” money. Teachers whose students have learned the most during the year will get a larger bonus. In order to make this competition as fair as possible so as to incentivize teachers to focus on all students, regardless of their ability at the start of the competition, each student is grouped into an ability group based on the test scores of Twaweza 2014 endline tests. Students not tested by Twaweza are grouped separately, and Grade 1 students are grouped by incorporating characteristics of their schools.
After endline testing in 2015, test scores will be used to rank each student within their ability group. Teachers whose students rank highest at endline will get paid the greatest amount, while teachers whose students rank lowest (or at the bottom) will receive nothing. Teachers who rank in between will earn an amount depending on the ranking of their students within each ability group.
This is the most high-powered design, according to education experts, in trying to incentivize teachers to exert greater effort leading to improvements in learning. As we want to reward teachers for improvements, we need to have two test results for each student: one at the end of last year, one at the end of this year. The difference in learning that we measure will determine how much the teacher earns.
6 schools in each of the 10 districts have been randomly assigned to the gains treatment group.
Control: Schools in the control group do not receive any type of teacher incentive program. 6 schools in each of the 10 districts have been randomly assigned to control.
Experimental design
This evaluation was conducted in 180 government primary schools in 10 randomly selected districts across Tanzania. 18 schools, of the initial 35 from the first phase of the project, were randomly allocated to one of the three program groups: levels (6 per district), gains (6 per district), or control (6 per district). Per the request of Twaweza, the implementing partner, the probability of assignment into different treatments was a function of the schools’ previous treatment status during KiuFunza I. (See the pre-analysis plan for further details on the allocation process.) In each sampled district, 6 schools were assigned to the control group and 6 schools were assigned to each treatment group, levels and gains.
The aims of the two treatment groups are as follows:
1. The levels teacher incentive intervention seeks to:
a. test the extent to which paying for performance improves basic literacy and numeracy; and
b. understand the effects of the intervention on public debate and citizen engagement.
2. The gains teacher incentive intervention seeks to:
a. test the extent to which paying for performance improves basic literacy and numeracy;
b. test how efficiently designed incentive programs enhance teacher motivation; and
c. understand the effects of the intervention on public debate and citizen engagement.
Design details
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