The Courtesy Game: Efficiency and Inequality
How to cite
Meemann, Christine; Heinrich, Timo; Strobel, Christina; Traub, Stefan. 2022. "The Courtesy Game: Efficiency and Inequality." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010034. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10034-2.0
Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.
* Primary investigator
Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment, we aim to study a new game, the courtesy game. The courtesy game is a simultaneous two-player game in which each player must choose between two strategies, X and Y. Game parameters are designed such that both players’ weakly dominant strategy is X, and the strategy profile (X, X) is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there are two other asymmetric Nash equilibria (X, Y) and (Y, X), that are Pareto efficient to the symmetric Nash equilibrium, and yielding the X-player the higher payoff. Thus, the Y-player is the courteous player, who accepts a lower payoff than her opponent in order to achieve efficiency. However, choosing Y is accompanied with a courtesy dilemma, since the strategy profile (Y, Y) yields the worst outcome for both players. In different variations of the game (one shot, repeated) we test if players play the weakly dominant strategy X or the courteous strategy Y.
Intervention
The aim of the experiment is to test for our new game, the courtesy game, if participants play the weakly dominant strategy of the game. We designed a simultaneous, two players, two strategies basic version of the game. We run two treatments:
• Repeated: Participants play 10 rounds of the game in groups of two under a perfect stranger matching with feedback after each round.
• One shot: Participants play one round of the game in groups of two under with direct feedback.
We additionally run the following treatment:
• Repeated Partner: Participants play 10 rounds of the game in groups of two under a partner matching with feedback after each round.
Experimental design
The laboratory experiment will be programmed in oTree (Chen et al. 2016) and conducted with participants of the University of Hamburg. Participants will read the instructions on screen and are requested to answer control questions before proceeding with the experiment.
Participants play 10 rounds (1 round in treatment one shot) of the game under a complete stranger matching in groups of two. Participants are informed of the matching procedure in the instructions. In each round, participants have to decide between strategy X or Y. After each round, participants receive feedback.
Additionally, in treatment ‘repeated partner’, participants play 10 rounds of the game under a partner matching in groups of two. Participants are informed of the matching procedure in the instructions. In each round, participants have to decide between strategy X or Y. After each round, participants receive feedback.
Before each round, participants are asked to state their belief what strategy choice (X or Y) the other player in this round will make. This belief request is unincentivised.
In the post-experimental questionnaire, we ask participants for:
• gender, age, field of study,
• risk, courtesy and patience attitudes,
• motives (payoff maximization, altruism, inequality aversion, efficiency or envy) behind their decisions in the experiment.
Further design details:
• Complete Stranger Matching
• Partner Matching
• On an individual level, the display of strategies in the payoff matrix (XY or YX) is randomized between subjects.
• Feedback after each round: Own strategy choice, strategy choice of the other player, own payoff for the respective round, payoff of the other player for the respective round
• Feedback at the end of the experiment: Own accumulated payoff
Design details
Cited by
No citation data available for this registration yet.