The Courtesy Game: Efficiency and Inequality

How to cite

Meemann, Christine; Heinrich, Timo; Strobel, Christina; Traub, Stefan. 2022. "The Courtesy Game: Efficiency and Inequality." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010034. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10034-2.0

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Christine Meemann* , Timo Heinrich , Christina Strobel , Stefan Traub

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010034
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10034-2.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
In development
Trial dates
2022-09-19 – 2023-09-30
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C71, C92, D60
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10034

Abstract

Using a laboratory experiment, we aim to study a new game, the courtesy game. The courtesy game is a simultaneous two-player game in which each player must choose between two strategies, X and Y. Game parameters are designed such that both players’ weakly dominant strategy is X, and the strategy profile (X, X) is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, there are two other asymmetric Nash equilibria (X, Y) and (Y, X), that are Pareto efficient to the symmetric Nash equilibrium, and yielding the X-player the higher payoff. Thus, the Y-player is the courteous player, who accepts a lower payoff than her opponent in order to achieve efficiency. However, choosing Y is accompanied with a courtesy dilemma, since the strategy profile (Y, Y) yields the worst outcome for both players. In different variations of the game (one shot, repeated) we test if players play the weakly dominant strategy X or the courteous strategy Y.

Intervention

The aim of the experiment is to test for our new game, the courtesy game, if participants play the weakly dominant strategy of the game. We designed a simultaneous, two players, two strategies basic version of the game. We run two treatments:

• Repeated: Participants play 10 rounds of the game in groups of two under a perfect stranger matching with feedback after each round.
• One shot: Participants play one round of the game in groups of two under with direct feedback.

We additionally run the following treatment:
• Repeated Partner: Participants play 10 rounds of the game in groups of two under a partner matching with feedback after each round.

Experimental design

The laboratory experiment will be programmed in oTree (Chen et al. 2016) and conducted with participants of the University of Hamburg. Participants will read the instructions on screen and are requested to answer control questions before proceeding with the experiment.

Participants play 10 rounds (1 round in treatment one shot) of the game under a complete stranger matching in groups of two. Participants are informed of the matching procedure in the instructions. In each round, participants have to decide between strategy X or Y. After each round, participants receive feedback.

Additionally, in treatment ‘repeated partner’, participants play 10 rounds of the game under a partner matching in groups of two. Participants are informed of the matching procedure in the instructions. In each round, participants have to decide between strategy X or Y. After each round, participants receive feedback.

Before each round, participants are asked to state their belief what strategy choice (X or Y) the other player in this round will make. This belief request is unincentivised.

In the post-experimental questionnaire, we ask participants for:

• gender, age, field of study,
• risk, courtesy and patience attitudes,
• motives (payoff maximization, altruism, inequality aversion, efficiency or envy) behind their decisions in the experiment.

Further design details:

• Complete Stranger Matching
• Partner Matching
• On an individual level, the display of strategies in the payoff matrix (XY or YX) is randomized between subjects.
• Feedback after each round: Own strategy choice, strategy choice of the other player, own payoff for the respective round, payoff of the other player for the respective round
• Feedback at the end of the experiment: Own accumulated payoff

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization (perfect stranger matching, partner matching and randomization of strategies within the payoff matrix) is done by a computer program (oTree).
Randomization unit
Individual level (randomization of strategies within the payoff matrix). Experimental session level (perfect stranger and partner matching).
Clusters
2 sessions à 24 participants for the repeated game (one treatment). 1 session à 24 participants for the one shot game (one treatment). Additionally: 2 session à 24 participants for the repeated game – partner matching.
Observations
2 sessions x 24 participants x 10 rounds = 480 individual observations for the repeated game, respectively 240 group observations (one group = 2 participants). 1 session x 24 participants x 1 round = 24 individual observations for the one shot game, respectively 12 group observations (one group = 2 participants). Additionally: 2 sessions x 24 participants x 10 rounds = 480 individual observations for the repeated game (partner matching), respectively 24 group observations (one group = 2 participants in 10 rounds).
Arms
48 participants in 2 sessions for the repeated game (one treatment). 48 participants in 2 sessions for the repeated game – partner matching (one treatment). 24 participants in 1 session for the one shot game (one treatment).
Primary outcomes
We are interested in: i) the strategy choice of players. ii) beliefs of players about the opponents’ strategy choice in each round.
Secondary outcomes
We are interested in: i) the major motive (payoff maximization, altruism, inequality aversion, efficiency or envy) behind the strategy choice – derived from questions in the post-experimental questionnaire. ii) the correlation between the strategy choice and personal characteristics like risk attitude, courtesy and patience – we derive these characteristics by self-reported measures from the post-experimental questionnaire.

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Keywords