Can Prosocial Incentives and Self-chosen Goals Improve Performance? An Online Real Effort Experiment

How to cite

Su, Yuxin; Capra, Monica; Cao, Yu. 2022. "Can Prosocial Incentives and Self-chosen Goals Improve Performance? An Online Real Effort Experiment." AEA RCT Registry. AEARCTR-0010025. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10025-1.0

Download: BibTeX · RIS — for reference managers without a browser translator. Zotero and most others pick up this page's citation metadata directly.

Yuxin Su* , Monica Capra , Yu Cao

* Primary investigator

Registry ID
AEARCTR-0010025
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.10025-1.0
First registered
Last updated
Status
On going
Trial dates
2019-11-23 – 2022-12-31
Countries
Private
JEL codes
C83, C90, J24, J30
Registry record
http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/10025

Abstract

We study incentive schemes that combine self-chosen goals with prosocial rewards. We design a real-effort task experiment with MTurk workers. Upon achieving self-chosen goals, rewards are paid to the worker in the monetary treatments or to charities in the prosocial treatments. To explore the mechanisms whereby rewards can improve performance with prosocial incentives, we develop a theoretical model with goal dependence and earning reference points. Our results show that when rewards are paid to charities, performance improvements happen through workers setting higher goals. This effect is stronger for those whose interests are matched with the charity’s mission. Our findings have important implications for incentivizing workers in the gig economy.

Intervention

In this paper, we study the performance of workers who set their own goals and are incentivized with rewards that are paid to a charity.

Experimental design

Our treatments consisted of: small monetary incentive (MONE-S), large monetary incentive (MONE-L), small prosocial incentive (PROS-S), large prosocial incentive (PROS-L), and a control treatment (NOINC) with no incentives.

Design details

Randomization method
Randomization done by computer
Randomization unit
Individual
Clusters
244 (the number of participants)
Observations
244
Arms
small monetary incentive (MONE-S): 50 participants; large monetary incentive (MONE-L): 50 participants; small prosocial incentive (PROS-S): 48 participants ; large prosocial incentive (PROS-L): 48 participants ; control treatment (NOINC):48 participant
Primary outcomes
prosocial incentives, self-chosen goals, workers' performance

Cited by

No citation data available for this registration yet.

Keywords