Mechanism Design

11 registrations.

Registry IDTitlePrimary investigatorFirst registered
AEARCTR-0018579Procurement under Imperfect Verification: How Audit Rules Shape Effort and ReportingAurel Stenzel
AEARCTR-0018545Who Gives a Dime? Experimental evidence on first-movers in fundraising mechanisms.Jakob Hofmann
AEARCTR-0011021Fairness and Legitimacy of Voting Methods in Digital Participatory BudgetingJoshua C. Yang
AEARCTR-0009466Fighting the learning loss: Evaluating C-SEF for university students and staff.Michelle González Amador
AEARCTR-0007305Using Divide-and-Conquer to Improve the Effectiveness of Tax Collection Under Limited Enforcement CapacitySamuel Kapon
AEARCTR-0007218Behavioral considerations in a dynamic matching mechanismRenke Schmacker
AEARCTR-0006685Increasing consumer surplus through a novel product testing mechanismUlrike Vollstaedt
AEARCTR-0004942Designing schemes for improved water qualityBen Balmford
AEARCTR-0004802Making the Most of Limited Government CapacitySamuel Kapon
AEARCTR-0003367The Equilibrium Impact of AI Assisted School ChoiceChristopher Neilson
AEARCTR-0000834Economic and Financial Models for Pricing and Setting Sanitation Tariffs for the Benefit of the Urban Poor, Evidence from Burkina FasoMolly Lipscomb